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PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
Michael P. Vandenbergh†
Environmental law has quietly transformed from a positive law field
deeply rooted in administrative law to one that is also heavily rooted in pri-
vate law and private governance.  After two decades (1970–1990) of re-
markable activity, more than two decades have now passed without a major
federal environmental statute (1991–2012).  Whether the appropriate next
step is expansion or contraction, reforms to the federal statutory framework
have stalled.  Federal regulatory activity and state and local measures have
filled some of the gap, but private governance efforts—the pursuit of public
ends through private standards, monitoring, enforcement, and dispute reso-
lution—now play an important role.  Corporations report that their toxics
use is regulated more by private supply chain contract requirements than the
federal toxics statute.  The fate of fourteen percent of the temperate forests and
seven percent of the fisheries around the world is in the hands of private
certification systems.  More money is spent on private environmental inspec-
tions than on the entire federal Environmental Protection Agency enforce-
ment office.  The emergence of private governance is hiding in plain view
because the conceptual model by which environmental law is viewed and the
metrics by which legal activity is measured do not square easily with private
governance.  Environmental preferences are expressed in private market deci-
sions, not through voting or lobbying.  Standard-setting, enforcement, and
dispute resolution occur through private actions and institutions, not legisla-
tures, agencies, or courts.  This Article demonstrates the value of conceptual-
izing seemingly disparate private activities as a discrete new model of
environmental governance.  Viewing private environmental governance in
this way provides new insights about collective action problems, reframes the
standards used for environmental instrument choice, and suggests new ac-
tors and actions to address environmental problems.
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INTRODUCTION
Environmental law is not what it once was.  It is no longer just a
subfield of positive law, namely administrative law, starting with man-
dates in the form of statutes, translated into regulations and enforced
by agencies, and reviewed by trial and appellate courts, generating oc-
casional iconic Supreme Court decisions such as Vermont Yankee,1 Chev-
ron,2 and Massachusetts v. EPA.3  It is understandable if this is your view
of environmental law.  If you took an introductory environmental law
class at almost any law school, read almost any environmental law
casebook or undergraduate policy textbook, read the 300 or more en-
vironmental law articles published every year, or followed environ-
mental policy debates in the mass media, you would be fully justified
in believing that this positive, public governance model is environ-
1 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519
(1978).
2 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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mental law.4  This is also the model that fits many of the metrics used
to monitor environmental law: the number of major statutes and regu-
lations, the costs and benefits of major regulations, the number of
pages devoted to environmental issues in the Federal Register, the size
of agency budgets and staff, and the number of enforcement actions
and reported decisions.5
The standard model of environmental law still describes impor-
tant aspects of what many environmental lawyers do and still has im-
portant effects on environmental behavior and environmental quality.
Government officials at the federal and state levels are still engaged in
developing, implementing, and enforcing important public environ-
mental regulations.  Industry and environmental groups lobby and lit-
igate to affect the scope and implementation of public environmental
laws and regulations.  Corporations change behavior in response to
regulations and enforcement actions affecting the handling of hazard-
ous materials and discharges to the air and water.  Household emis-
sions are affected by new motor vehicle tailpipe standards, appliance
efficiency standards, and pesticide regulations.  In some regions, states
have adopted new statutes and local governments have adopted new
ordinances to address climate change, toxics, and other issues.6
Yet no major federal environmental statute has been enacted
since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.  The period of statutory
inaction (1991–2012) now exceeds the period of statutory growth
(1970–1990).7  Despite substantial scholarship and advocacy directed
toward the development of new public governance schemes, no major
federal statute on climate change is likely in the near term,8 even
though climate issues are arguably a more fundamental threat to the
domestic and global environment than the problems addressed by the
framework erected between 1970 and 1990.9  Reasonable arguments
4 See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029,
2030–32 (2005); Dan Tarlock, Is a Substantive, Non-Positivist United States Environmental Law
Possible?, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 159, 162 n.9 (2012); Linda K. Breggin, Jacob P. Byl,
Lynsey R. Gaudioso, Seamus T. Kelly & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Comment, Trends in Envi-
ronmental Law Scholarship 2008–2012, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 10643, 10644–45 (2013).
5 See infra notes 274–76 and accompanying text. R
6 See Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential for
Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669, 669 (2010).
7 See infra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.  Many environmental analyses discuss R
the turbulent policy process of the last two decades but often overlook the absence of
major new statutes.  An exception is Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of
Deliberative Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 628–29 (2006).
8 See Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global Envi-
ronmental Change, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 550, 550 (2010).
9 See Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109 COLUM.
L. REV. 1531, 1554 (2009); Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change:
Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1155–56 (2009);
Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis,
99 CALIF. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2011).
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can be made that other emerging issues such as fracking, environmen-
tal estrogens, nanotechnology, non-point source pollution, and deep-
water oil drilling would be better addressed with a major federal
statute, but none has emerged.10  Although notable exceptions exist
at the state and local levels (e.g., California’s climate law, AB 32), it is
hard to argue that there has been a profusion of environmental legis-
lative activity at these levels.
The absence of major statutory action is relevant whether the pre-
ferred outcome is to expand or shrink the scope of the statutory
framework.  Efforts to streamline or scale back federal environmental
statutes have had as little success as efforts to expand the framework.11
Major legislative initiatives designed to reform the Superfund statute,
to reduce the reach of the Clean Water Act, and to insert cost-benefit
analysis requirements into the federal environmental statutes have all
failed.  The emissions trading innovations of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments have not led to new emissions trading provisions in the
Clean Water Act or other statutes.  In short, what looked like a pause
in the development of the federal environmental statutory scheme in
the early 2000s now should be viewed as a more fundamental shift in
the social response to environmental threats.
Although the shift away from public governance is not as stark in
some other countries, comparable developments have occurred at the
international level.  Despite a remarkable number of conferences,
pronouncements, and treaties, few significant binding environmental
requirements have emerged at the international level.12  International
efforts to prevent depletion of major fisheries and tropical deforesta-
tion have failed.13  On climate change, the sweeping rhetoric of the
1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCC) has given way to the disappointments of Kyoto and Copen-
10 See, e.g., David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of En-
ergy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 432 (2013) (concluding that it is premature for a
federal fracking statute given current information).
11 See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 125, 149–50 (2004)
(noting the absence of “statutory overhauls” in the 1990s and describing the period as
“maintaining the road”); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 96–98 (5th ed. 2006) (describing the 1990s as a period of “[r]ecoil
and [r]einvention”).
12 Richard Lazarus has noted that the 1990s was a period of dynamism and growth in
environmental treaties but also noted that the impacts have been limited. LAZARUS, supra
note 11, at 145, 210 (concluding that as of 2000, seventy percent of the most important fish R
species were in decline).
13 See, e.g., Allison Winter,  Fisheries: WTO Searches for Path Forward to Deal with ‘Alarming’
Status of Fish Stocks, E&ENEWS PM, Apr. 21, 2011, available at http://oceana.org/sites/de
fault/files/oceana_in_the_news/EE_WTO_searches_for_path_forward_to_deal_with_
alarming_status_of_fish_stalks_04.21.2011.pdf (reporting that “[d]espite ‘strong consen-
sus’ among World Trade Organization delegates that they should respond to a ‘crisis’ in
global fisheries, trade talks on international fisheries subsidies largely remain stalemated”).
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hagen, and finally after Durban, to an agreement to try to reach an
agreement with binding targets by 2020.14  More than 45,000 people
flew to the 2012 Rio+20 Conference only to leave with a sense that
public governance will not yield a timely international response.15
The notion that a comprehensive international agreement will not be
possible in time to achieve widely acknowledged temperature targets
is gaining momentum among scholars and policymakers.16
The lack of major federal statutes in the last two decades can be
ascribed to many causes, but not to a simple decline in general public
support for environmental protection.  Assessing public support for
environmental protection is difficult, and in some cases the relative
priority given to environmental issues has shifted, but general public
support for environmental protection has remained surprisingly
strong.17  This Article argues that environmental preferences have
been expressed not just through the political process, whether at the
federal, state, or local levels, but also through private interactions in
social settings and the marketplace.  The product is private environ-
mental governance—a new model of legal and extralegal influences
on the environmentally significant behavior of corporations and
households.  Private–private interactions now generate many of the
environmental requirements that affect corporate and household be-
havior, and ultimately environmental quality.  These new private envi-
ronmental governance activities play the standard-setting,
implementation, monitoring, enforcement, and adjudication roles
traditionally played by public regulatory regimes.18  They also interact
in complex ways with public regulatory regimes, in some cases provid-
ing independent standards and enforcement, in others providing pri-
vate enforcement of public standards, and in others undermining
support for public standards.
Understanding private environmental governance requires a syn-
thetic approach and an analytic approach: a synthetic approach to
14 See Dean Scott, Pledge Toward 2020 Global Deal Ensures Decade of Inaction, World Bank
Official Says, ENV’T. REP. (BNA) Jan. 13, 2012, at 17; John M. Broder, Climate Talks Yield
Limited Agreement to Work Toward Replacing Kyoto Protocol, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2011, at A9.
15 See Colin Sullivan, Are U.N. Environmental Mega-Conferences a Dying Breed?, E&E PUB-
LISHING, LLC  (June 25, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059966396.
16 See DAVID G. VICTOR, GLOBAL WARMING GRIDLOCK: CREATING MORE EFFECTIVE STRAT-
EGIES FOR PROTECTING THE PLANET 1 (2011).
17 See, e.g., David P. Daniels et al., Public Opinion on Environmental Policy in the United
States, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 461, 467–70 (Sheldon
Kamieniecki & Michael E. Kraft eds., 2013) (noting the difficulties of assessing public sup-
port for environmental protection and presenting data showing variations in public sup-
port for environmental protection from the early 1970s until 2010 but no substantial
downward shift).
18 See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Stan-
dards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 44, 46
(Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009).
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identify the common features of seemingly disparate activities that fall
outside the standard model; and an analytic approach to examine the
incentives of the participants, the potential areas of influence, and the
strengths and weaknesses of these activities as a form of governance.
This Article does not suggest that private governance is a complete or
optimal response to existing environmental problems.  It does suggest
that private governance is an increasingly important and growing
component of modern environmental governance.
A check on the value of conceptualizing private environmental
governance as a discrete new model is to read almost any leading text
on environmental law and policy and ask whether the unspoken as-
sumption is that the actor is the government and the action is some
form of positive law (statute, regulation, or court decision interpreting
the development and enforcement of statutes and regulations).  This
conceptual model is nearly ubiquitous, and it limits our understand-
ing of environmental governance today and of the options available to
address new challenges.  For example, a leading history of environ-
mental law describes the topic as “the effort to fashion pollution con-
trol laws” and the challenge as arising from “our nation’s varied
processes for lawmaking and the ways those processes relate to impor-
tant cultural norms.”19  The adoption of environmental laws is diffi-
cult in this view not only because of the features of ecological
problems, but also because of “the structure and character of lawmak-
ing institutions in the United States.”20  Similarly, an influential recent
essay on optimal responses to climate change suggests that
“[d]omestic policy design faces one central question:  Where should
government intervene?”21  A leading undergraduate text on environ-
mental policy begins with the proposition that “[h]uman uses of the
environment are matters of governance, not merely of individual
choice or economic markets[,]” and then responds to the argument
that free markets will provide environmental amenities with an answer
that assumes that governance means government: “For at least seven
reasons, however, government involvement in environmental issues is
both necessary and inevitable.”22  The analysis then flows naturally to
ask “[w]hat kinds of government actions are the best tools for achiev-
ing public policy goals?”23
19 LAZARUS, supra note 11, at xv. R
20 Id. at 2.  Lazarus does note the emergence of private certification systems, but he
was writing in the early 2000s when many types of private governance were only beginning
to emerge. See id. at 188.
21 Michael Levi, The Hidden Risks of Energy Innovation, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH.  Winter
2013, at 73.
22 RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES: A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 1–2 (1999).
23 Id. at 7.
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The standard model accurately described environmental law dur-
ing much of its history.  Government was the dominant if not exclu-
sive creator of environmental standards, and environmental
scholarship focused on the instrument choices faced by government.
The scholarship based on that model has examined the merits of com-
peting regulatory instruments: government technology- or perform-
ance-based standards on the one hand, and government-created
market mechanisms, such as cap-and-trade or tax programs, on the
other.24  More recently, New Governance scholars have noted that
government has privatized some functions25 and that public govern-
ance often includes public–private hybrids and collaborative govern-
ance.26  Scholars also have expanded the instrument choice literature
by focusing on how governments can create incentives for environ-
mental information disclosure and adoption of corporate manage-
ment systems.27
The standard model remains vital to the resolution of environ-
mental problems, but private environmental governance has emerged
to complement and compete with it.  At the domestic level, private
governance is pervasive.  Lawyers in private firms spend much of their
time advising clients on compliance with private standards and on pri-
vate transactions driven by environmental investigations, risk reduc-
tion, and risk-shifting, with public environmental laws being only one
concern on the list.28  Corporations spend over $500 million on pri-
vate environmental investigations in connection with commercial
transactions annually, greater than the $400 million annual budget of
the entire Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enforcement of-
24 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 96–98 (1982) (discussing
technology-based regulatory instruments); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Com-
ment, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1341–42 (1985) (noting the
advantages of emissions trading).
25 See Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Introduction: Reframing the Outsourcing Debates, in
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1, 20 (Jody Freeman
& Martha Minow eds., 2009); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatiza-
tion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1285 (2003).
26 See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 2 (1997).
27 See Richard B. Stewart, Instrument Choice, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 147, 152–54 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007).  For further
discussion on environmental information disclosure, see Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Pro-
tection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 115 (2004) (arguing that emerging
technologies will expand the range of environmental information disclosures and protec-
tion strategies); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins
and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 614 (1999) (detailing environmental statutes requiring
private or public disclosure); see also Cary Coglianese, Policies to Promote Systematic Environ-
mental Management, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS? 181, 181–95 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001)
(discussing government policies that promote adoption of corporate environmental man-
agement systems).
28 See Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 2048–49. R
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fice.29  One study of roughly eighty firms in eight sectors concluded
that more than half of the firms impose private environmental re-
quirements on their suppliers,30 and another study of over 1,000 firms
reported that roughly forty percent impose such requirements.31  In
some sectors, private corporate supply chain requirements are becom-
ing the de facto constraints on the presence of toxics in consumer
products.32  Many corporations have adopted environmental manage-
ment systems not because of government requirements but because
their supply contracts require them to comply with a private
standard.33
At the international level, private governance plays an even larger
role.  The most important development at the recent Rio+20 interna-
tional conference was not an international agreement but a coordi-
nated announcement of private commitments to reduce carbon
emissions.34  Roughly fourteen percent of the temperate forests
around the world (nine percent of all productive forests) and seven
percent of all fish caught for human consumption are subject to pri-
vate certification systems that establish and enforce private manage-
ment standards or increase the enforcement of government
standards.35  In some cases, private standards and enforcement oper-
29 See Michael B. Gerrard, A Proposal to Use Transactions to Leverage Environmental Disclo-
sure and Compliance, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROM
TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 420, 422 (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds., 2007)
(noting the amount spent on Phase I environmental assessments); Vandenbergh, supra
note 4, at 2049 (noting the size of the EPA’s enforcement budget). R
30 See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting
in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 916–17 (2007).
31 See THOMAS SINGER & MATTEO TONELLO, CONFERENCE BD., SUSTAINABILITY PRAC-
TICES: 2012 EDITION 101 (2012).
32 See, e.g., Upcoming Lautenberg Bill Could Be Key Test for TSCA Reform this Congress, IN-
SIDE E.P.A. WEEKLY REPORT, Apr. 1, 2011, at 6 [hereinafter INSIDE E.P.A.] (quoting Ernie
Rosenberg of the American Cleaning Institute for the proposition that “[t]he loss of public
confidence [in the public regulatory system means] we’re going to increasingly have retail-
ers that are regulators, like Wal-Mart and Target”).
33 See Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Management-Based Strategies: An Emerging Ap-
proach to Environmental Protection, in LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED
STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 3, 7, 10–11 (Cary Coglianese &
Jennifer Nash eds., 2006).
34 See JUAN COSTA CLIMENT & STEPHEN STARBUCK, ERNST & YOUNG LLP, WHAT DID
RIO+20 DELIVER FOR BUSINESS? 2 (2012), available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLU
Assets/Rio_20_Summit_leaves_lasting_legacy/$FILE/Rio_20_Summit_leaves_lasting_leg
acy.pdf; Richard Matthews, Rio+20 Announcement: US Partners with CEOs to Reduce Deforesta-
tion Through Sustainable Agriculture, GREEN MARKET ORACLE (June 22, 2012), http://www.
thegreenmarketoracle.com/2012/06/rio20-announcement-us-partners-with.html; Commit-
ments, CLOUD OF COMMITMENTS, http://www.cloudofcommitments.org/commitments/
(last visited Sept. 11, 2013).
35 See STEERING COMM. OF STATE-OF-KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT OF STANDARDS & CERTIFI-
CATION, TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY: THE ROLES AND LIMITATIONS OF CERTIFICATION 9 (2012)
[hereinafter TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY] (noting certification of nine percent of productive
forests and seven percent of global landings of wild fish caught for human consumption);
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ate with little or no government involvement, but in others, govern-
ment requirements stimulate or provide the floor for private market
responses.  Much of the enforcement of public and private environ-
mental standards in some countries arises through private inspectors
enforcing private certification standards or supply chain contract
requirements.
All of this private activity might be meaningless or even harmful if
it is just green-washing—private activity designed to give the appear-
ance of environmental benefits without delivering actual benefits.
Corporations have incentives to use private governance to mollify
stakeholder concerns and to displace more stringent government reg-
ulation, and it would be surprising if some private efforts do not have
these effects.  A recent comprehensive review of empirical research on
private environmental certification systems, however, finds evidence
of substantial positive impacts on corporate environmental behavior
at the global and local levels.36  This conclusion is consistent with a
number of studies of other forms of private environmental govern-
ance.37  The effects on corporate behavior are better established than
the effects on environmental quality, but early indications suggest that
some private governance programs have important effects on environ-
mental quality as well.38  A balanced, sophisticated understanding of
private and public environmental governance is necessary to sift out
the wheat from the chaff.
Despite the proliferation of private environmental governance ac-
tivities and evidence of impacts, it is easy to miss the significance of
these developments if we assume government is the relevant actor for
resolving collective action problems and positive law is the action.  En-
vironmental preferences are expressed in purchasing, lending, invest-
ing, and supply chain contracting decisions, not just at the ballot box
or through lobbying public officials.  In fact, lobbying now often oc-
curs when a firm or trade association lobbies a private organization,
not the government, regarding its environmental standards.39  Stan-
dard-setting occurs in private stakeholder groups or supply chain con-
tract negotiations, not just through notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Enforcement occurs through shaming, boycotts, private inspections,
contract terminations or non-renewals, and preferential purchasing,
not just through government inspections and sanctions.  Disputes are
often resolved in private conferences or arbitration proceedings, not
Introduction to Certification, PAPER LIFE CYCLE, http://thepaperlifecycle.org/forests/in-
depth/introduction-to-certification/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2013) (noting certification of
fourteen percent of temperate forests).
36 See TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 35, at A-194. R
37 See discussion infra Parts III.D.2–3.
38 See discussion infra Part III.D.3.
39 See infra note 226 and accompanying text. R
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federal, state, or international courts.  This private activity generates
pressure on environmental behavior without resulting in a statute,
regulation, agency enforcement action, or court decision for review by
scholars and policymakers.
Adding an understanding of private governance to the standard
model is valuable for several reasons.  First, the emergence of private
environmental governance suggests new ways to think about the col-
lective action problems that impede environmental protection at the
domestic and global levels.  Analysts often move from identifying a
collective action problem to evaluating which types of government ac-
tion can address the problem, but this move misses important steps.
The private model identifies sources of pressure on firm behavior
other than government regulation.  It also identifies reasons why pri-
vate governance may be easier to achieve than public governance.  Pri-
vate market behavior may be less costly to individuals than political
behavior and may require little or no collective action.  Information
collection and distribution may be less costly than government lobby-
ing, firms may be more responsive to small shifts in consumer and
other market behavior than the government is to shifts in public opin-
ion, and small-group, iterative settings may arise among advocacy
group and corporate leaders even though the sources of the problem
and harms occur half way around the globe.  In addition, national
sovereignty concerns and the international trade regime may be less
of a barrier to private environmental governance than they are to pub-
lic regulation.
Second, the existence of the private governance option suggests
the need to shift the decision heuristic applied to the evaluation of
environmental laws and programs.40  The existence of private govern-
ance options places a premium on understanding the counterfactual:
What would have occurred in the absence of this activity?  The ques-
tion is not what will happen as compared to a hypothetical optimal
government intervention, but what will happen as compared to the
viable alternatives.  If government is unable to act, an imperfect pri-
vate governance measure may be preferable to the hypothetical public
measure so long as the private measure is efficient and effective, and
does not decrease the chance of a better public or private action.  For
example, a private fisheries program may not “solve” the problem of
40 See generally Jonathan M. Gilligan & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Accounting for Political
Feasibility in Climate Instrument Choice, 32 VA. ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2220788 (proposing explicit consid-
eration of political opportunity costs in evaluating climate policy instruments); NEIL K.
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUB-
LIC POLICY (1994) (emphasizing the importance of institutional choice analysis); Edward L.
Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1996) (arguing for synthesis of discourse in institutional analysis).
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overharvesting, but it may improve the condition of the fishery by fill-
ing a gap that the government is unable to fill or by complementing
or buying time for government action.
Third and most important, an understanding of the private gov-
ernance model can induce scholars to identify new solutions to envi-
ronmental and other collective action problems.  When private
instruments are included among the governance options, it is not suf-
ficient to identify optimal public regulatory instruments or public-pri-
vate hybrids.  Both the actor and the action are in play; government
may not always be the best actor, and public regulation may not always
be the best type of intervention.  The optimal response may be private
governance or a mix of public and private governance.41  Understand-
ing private environmental governance can lead to new options for
tackling climate change, fracking, environmental estrogens, and other
important new challenges, as well as for addressing concerns about
the cost and intrusiveness of environmental protection.42  It also can
lead private advocacy organizations and foundations to shift from a
focus on government lobbying and oversight of regulators to a focus
on creating private incentives and institutions to facilitate individual
and corporate behavior change.
A common formula in legal scholarship is to argue that an impor-
tant development has been ignored and to claim to be the first to have
identified or named the development.  Too often the new develop-
ment is not as important or as novel as the article claims, and claims of
paradigm creation are overstated.43  This Article does not claim that
many of the private–private activities discussed here have been over-
looked.  As the footnotes suggest, an enormous amount of scholarship
has been published on private governance activities, although much
of that scholarship has appeared in the social science literature or ar-
eas of the legal literature outside of environmental law.  The Article
does claim that these activities, when viewed in the aggregate, re-
present a development in environmental law and governance that is
not apparent from viewing any one activity in isolation or from ex-
isting scholarship.  It also draws on recent empirical research to
demonstrate that these activities are having important effects on envi-
ronmental behavior and environmental quality.  Perhaps most impor-
tantly, it offers the first steps toward a coherent theory of private
41 For articles that compare public governance approaches, see generally Robert N.
Stavins, Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can National Governments Address a Global
Problem?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293 (discussing various frameworks and instruments that
nations and groups of nations can adopt to combat climate change); Jonathan Baert Wie-
ner, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677
(1999) (analyzing various environmental regulatory instruments).
42 See discussion infra Part III.F.
43 I thank Richard Lazarus for this observation.
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environmental governance that can facilitate critical analysis of ex-
isting public and private governance activities and identify opportuni-
ties for new applications.  In short, although public governance still
plays a large role, this Article offers an understanding of private gov-
ernance that challenges the near-monopoly that public governance
has exerted over environmental law scholarship, policymaking, orga-
nizations, and teaching for the last four decades.
I
THE GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
Roughly two dozen major federal environmental statutes were en-
acted from 1970 to 1990,44 but none has emerged since.45  The EPA
and other agencies have continued to engage in substantial amounts
of rulemaking, monitoring, and enforcement of statutory require-
ments.  In addition, some state and local governments have also been
active, whether in expanding or shrinking the environmental regula-
tory regime.46  These public activities fit squarely within traditional
conceptions of environmental law, and in areas such as greenhouse
gas requirements for mobile and stationary sources, the federal regu-
latory activity has been extensive.47
44 For example, the statutes enacted during the 1970–1990 period that fit comfortably
in almost any definition of “major” include the National Environmental Policy Act (signed
into law on January 1, 1970), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006 & Supp. V 2011); the Clean Air
Act (1970, later amended by the Clean Air Act Amendments in 1977 and 1990), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401–7626 (2006); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments (1972, later
amended by the Clean Water Act in 1977 and the Water Quality Act in 1987), 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251–1376 (2006 & Supp. V 2011); the Coastal Zone Management Act (1972), 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1451–1464 (2012); the Safe Drinking Water Act (1974), 42 U.S.C. § 300f–300j (2006);
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (1976, followed by the Hazardous and Solid
Waste Amendments in 1984), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2006); the Toxic Substances Con-
trol Act (1976), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2671 (2012); the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA, or “Superfund”) (1980, followed by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act in 1986), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9628
(2006); the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (1986), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11004–11049 (2006); and the Oil Pollution Act (1990), 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2761 (2006 &
Supp. V 2011).
45 It is possible to argue that the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA),
7 U.S.C. § 136a, d, q, w (2012), and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) Amendments
qualify as “major.” See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 11, at 125 (identifying the SDWA Amend- R
ments and the FQPA as the only major statutes during the 1990s); Reference/Links: Environ-
mental Laws & Treaties, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/reference/laws.
asp (last visited Sept. 2, 2013) (including the FPQA as the only major statute from the
1990–2012 period).
46 See, e.g., John R. Nolon, The Land Use Stabilization Wedge Strategy: Shifting Ground to
Mitigate Climate Change, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 1 (2009) (describing how
local governments are regulating land use to combat climate change); Trisolini, supra note
6, at 734–35 (discussing local climate change initiatives). R
47 See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average
Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,329–30 (May 7, 2010) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536, 537, 538); Proposed
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-1\CRN103.txt unknown Seq: 13 12-NOV-13 14:03
2013] PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 141
In the face of this activity, it is easy to overlook the large number
of private environmental governance initiatives that have emerged
during this period.  This private governance activity suggests that pub-
lic preferences for environmental protection often have been ex-
pressed through the marketplace and other private activities rather
than through the political system.  Part I develops a working defini-
tion of private environmental governance and demonstrates the range
and extent of these private governance activities.
A. What Is Private Environmental Governance?
A barrier to defining private environmental governance is that
two different legal fields with distinct vocabularies and conceptual
frameworks have legitimate claims to the territory.  I begin with a pri-
vate law analysis and then turn to public law.  I start with fundamentals
because the role of private environmental governance only becomes
clear if we begin with underlying assumptions and analytical ap-
proaches.  Many questions remain about the origins and function of
private environmental governance, but this uncertainty is true for en-
vironmental governance more generally.  A substantial literature
notes the lack of a dominant, coherent framework for understanding
environmental law and policy.48
The standard law and economics approach to analyzing the need
for environmental governance proceeds along two levels.  At the out-
set, environmental problems occur because some forms of environ-
mental quality are common pool resources (CPR) that are subject to
overuse.49  Individuals and firms gain all of the advantages of using a
CPR but share the costs and thus have incentives to overexploit the
resource.  These activities can take the form of harvesting commons
resources (e.g., open-ocean fisheries) or emitting pollution (e.g., air
Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Cor-
porate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 49,454, 49,483 (proposed Sept. 28,
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86, 600; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 537, 538) (describing
“Temporary Lead-Time Allowance Alternative Standards”).
48 See, e.g., Tarlock, supra note 4, at 160–61 n.1 (noting the absence of a “there there” R
in environmental law).
49 A vast collection of literature exists on common pool resources, public goods, ex-
ternalities, and the implications for environmental law. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS
ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 45–46 (5th ed. 2008).  For my purposes, it is sufficient to note
that common pool resources are nonexcludable but rivalrous (e.g., fisheries).  As a result,
people have incentives to use as much as possible, leading to overuse.  Public goods are
nonexcludable and nonrivalrous.  Public goods are undersupplied because people contrib-
ute less than their private valuation of the good given the possibility of free riding.  In
addition, private goods may have externalities that are both excludable and rivalrous, but
the consumer does not pay the full price for the product because costs that are not valued
in the market exist.  I do not seek to contribute to the literature on these points here but
seek to note that responses to common pool resources, public goods, and externalities are
occurring in ways not contemplated by an exclusive focus on public governance.
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and water emissions, in which case the commons is being used as a
sink or dump).
A similar problem exists with the creation of some public goods
(e.g., information or basic research).  Individuals and firms may bear
all of the costs but share the benefits and have incentives to undersup-
ply the goods.  In these cases, public goods may be underproduced
because those who create them cannot capture a sufficient share of
the benefits.  Information about the environmental provenance and
performance of goods and the environmental effects of corporate be-
havior are examples.
CPRs tend to be overused and public goods tend to be undersup-
plied without collective action, but collective action is difficult because
of the transaction costs of organizing and incentives to free ride.50
Individuals have an incentive to free ride in the exploitation of a CPR
and in the provision of a public good (the first-order collective action
problem).  They also have incentives to free ride in the formation of
and support for groups that seek to address these problems (the sec-
ond-order collective action problem).51
In 1968, Garret Hardin identified the first-order collective action
problem regarding global common pool resources and suggested that
the options were ruin or the use of external, coercive authority to pro-
tect the resources.52  Government could exercise this coercive author-
ity by regulating or creating private property rights.53  Hardin did not
explain how this government coercive authority would arise, and a few
years earlier Mancur Olson had noted the second-order collective ac-
tion problem that discourages the formation of the advocacy groups
that drive government action.54  At this point, the choice seemed to
be between overcoming the substantial hurdles to national and inter-
national government regulation on the one hand and depletion of
natural resources and environmental degradation on the other.
For some types of commons problems, a more optimistic outlook
emerged in the following decades.  Elinor Ostrom demonstrated that
small groups can act collectively to manage resources without external
coercive authority in some situations.55  The work by Ostrom and
50 See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 24, at 15–34. R
51 See MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 11–12 (1965).
52 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244–46 (1968).
53 See id.  For a discussion of Hardin’s options, see Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom &
Paul C. Stern, The Struggle to Govern the Commons, 302 SCI. 1907, 1907 (2003).
54 See OLSON, supra note 51, at 11–12. R
55 ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 90 (1990) [hereinafter OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS]; ELINOR
OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 259 (2005); Dietz, Ostrom & Stern,
supra note 53, at 1907 (concluding that “[l]ocally evolved institutional arrangements gov- R
erned by stable communities and buffered from outside forces have sustained resources
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others suggested that in some small, closed commons situations, re-
sources are often not overexploited or undersupplied.  Ostrom devel-
oped criteria for the development of successful collective action, such
as small, stable communities and limited outside pressure on the re-
source.56  A parallel literature developed by Ellickson and others in
law and economics focused less on common pool resources but identi-
fied comparable conditions for private ordering.  This work identified
important characteristics for norm-based private ordering such as iter-
ative relationships, adequate information, and opportunities for social
sanctioning.57  The private ordering research by Ostrom, Ellickson,
and others holds promise for management of some closed commons
situations, including those faced by lobster fishermen in Maine and
perhaps even the situation Hardin alluded to in his 1968 article: medi-
eval English herders using a commons for cattle grazing.58
Many of the most pressing environmental protection problems
occur at large scales (e.g., pollutants in watersheds that encompass
multiple jurisdictional boundaries), however, and do not involve the
types of commons problems that are likely to be resolved through
small group action (e.g., fisheries with open access and strong pres-
sure on the resource).  For environmental protection problems such
as climate change, open ocean fisheries, and stratospheric ozone de-
pletion, the response must occur despite the existence of large
groups, few opportunities for iterative relationships, limited informa-
tion, and substantial pressure on the resource.  In addition, a third-
order collective action problem exists for many of these problems,
since not only must collective action occur within any one nation, but
it also must occur among many of the 192 nations in the international
community.59  The need for coercive authority for many environmen-
tal problems remains, and it exists at the local, national, regional, and
global levels.
A natural next step, seemingly confirmed by the developments of
the first era of environmental law, is that the source of coercive au-
successfully for centuries”); see also Oran R. Young, Building Regimes for Socioecological Systems:
Institutional Diagnostics, in INSTITUTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: PRINCIPAL FINDINGS,
APPLICATIONS, AND RESEARCH FRONTIERS 115, 123 (Oran R. Young, Leslie A. King & Heike
Schroeder eds., 2008) (discussing effective “self-contained” institutional arrangements).
56 See OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 55, at 90.  For a discussion of the R
implications of Ostrom’s work for global commons problems, see Dietz, Ostrom & Stern,
supra note 53, at 1907–09. R
57 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
124 (1991); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 34–35 (2000).
58 See Dietz, Ostrom & Stern, supra note 53, at 1907 (noting the evolution of “self- R
governing institutions”).
59 For a discussion of collective action problems that arise among nations on a global
scale, see Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental Regulation,
87 GEO. L.J. 749, 750 (1999).
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thority to address collective action problems is the government, and
public governance is thus necessary for environmental protection.60
The classic environmental analysis in the social science literature thus
moves from an examination of collective action problems to an as-
sumption that the actor that can resolve the collective action problem
in large-group, open commons situations is the government.61  The
assumed form of the intervention is public laws and policies.  Hardin
makes this move unequivocally, arguing that a global government is
necessary to address global environmental problems.62
Although economists prefer market solutions, a largely unspoken
assumption is that government is the actor that can provide the coer-
cive authority necessary to resolve environmental collective action
problems.  Economists see environmental problems as market failures
and try to identify the response that most directly corrects the market
failure at least cost to society.  Government action can be judged
based on whether the response is efficient: the beneficiaries can com-
pensate the losers and have something left over.63  Public governance
can occur through a wide range of public legal measures by interna-
tional, national, and subnational governments, such as command and
control regulations, liability schemes, taxes, subsidies, entitlements to
pollute, or mandated information disclosure.  In each of these scena-
rios, the government acts to manage a CPR, ensure the provision of a
public good, or reduce a negative externality, and the core questions
are how governments can be induced to act and what the design of
the public governance measures should be.
This analysis assumes that government plays a strong role in the
protection or creation of property rights to correct the market failure.
For example, the Coasian solution that has been most widely noted in
environmental law, the trading of acid rain precursors, was made pos-
sible by the creation of property rights or entitlements to pollute in
Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.  Similarly, al-
though cap-and-trade has been a favored response to climate change,
it requires government action such as the Waxman-Markey climate
legislation, which would have created a similar entitlement system for
greenhouse gas emissions.  Pollution taxes, the other favorite of econ-
omists, also require a strong government role to impose, collect, and
60 See, e.g., ANDREWS, supra note 22, at 1–2.  This is also consistent with the Westpha- R
lian structure. See Errol E. Meidinger, The New Environmental Law: Forest Certification, 10
BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 211, 257 (2002).
61 See ANDREWS, supra note 22, at 1–2. R
62 See Dietz, Ostrom & Stern, supra note 53, at 1907; Hardin, supra note 52, at 1243. R
63 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 49, at 45–46. R
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distribute the proceeds of the taxes.64  Similarly, when information
provision is the response to overcoming market failures, economists
typically assume that the government either collects and discloses the
information directly or requires regulated entities to disclose.65  Even
strong free market advocates assume that the government will create
property rights, the courts in which parties bring common law tort
claims, and the enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with
court orders.66  In short, private law treatments of environmental law
offer a rigorous analysis of the origins of environmental problems and
a preferred type of solution, but the solution typically requires public
action to correct the private market failure.
In contrast, public law treatments of environmental law do not
present the analytically tidy view of environmental problems and solu-
tions offered by private law scholars.67  The leading environmental law
casebooks by public law scholars offer a mix of readings about game
theory and collective action problems, economics, and environmental
ethics, and then move to an analysis of the process and products of
positive law.68  This is a reflection of the state of the field, not a short-
coming of the texts.  A traditional public law analysis might start with
the assertion that environmental or human health harms arising from
pollution or resource depletion undermine public welfare or social
justice, and that the appropriate response of the state is to adopt stat-
utes and regulations through democratic processes.  These statutes
enable government to regulate sources of pollution and resource ex-
traction and in some cases create rights in individuals or institutions
to be free from pollution or resource depletion.  The role of the gov-
ernment is to reduce environmental harms and secure those rights in
the face of collective action problems.  Various aspects of constitu-
tional and administrative law determine the extent to which these stat-
utory ends or rights will be protected, what level of government
64 See Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 502 n.11 (2009); Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade
System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 348–53 (2008).
65 An exception is Tom Lyon. See Thomas P. Lyon, Environmental Governance: An Eco-
nomic Perspective, in GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEW PERSPECTIVES 43, 43 (Magali
A. Delmas & Oran R. Young eds., 2009) (discussing environmental governance through
“private politics” and “the workings of the marketplace”).
66 See TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 3
(1991).
67 See, e.g., DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 9–10 (2010).  For a general treatment of regulatory justifica-
tions in administrative law, see LISA SCHULTZ BRESSMAN, EDWARD L. RUBIN & KEVIN M.
STACK, THE REGULATORY STATE 61–75 (2010) (presenting the economic justifications for
regulation, including environmental regulation, developed by Stephen Breyer).
68 See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES & MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (7th
ed. 2006); PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 11. R
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should act, how government actors will be held accountable, and who
will bear the costs.
The common feature of both the public and private law views is
that the source of coercive authority needed to address environmental
problems is the government.  With the limited exception of the closed
commons problems identified by Ostrom and others, the government
either intervenes to enable the market to operate more efficiently, to
protect rights, or to achieve particular environmental outcomes.  In
recent years, the New Governance literature has noted that govern-
ment not only acts unilaterally, but also in the form of a wide range of
public–private hybrids in which the government remains an impor-
tant, if not essential, actor.69  In short, although deep differences exist
between public and private law scholars who address environmental
problems, the government is the source of the coercive authority and
positive law is the core instrument.
Regardless of which framework is used, however, the emergence
of private environmental governance in the last two decades suggests
that a different response to collective action problems is possible.  By
private environmental governance, I mean actions taken by non-gov-
ernmental entities that are designed to achieve traditionally govern-
mental ends such as managing the exploitation of common pool
resources, increasing the provision of public goods, reducing environ-
mental externalities, or more justly distributing environmental ameni-
ties.  The actions taken by these non-governmental entities often
include the traditional standard-setting, implementation, monitoring,
enforcement, and adjudication functions of governments.70
Many treatments of private environmental governance in political
science, international relations, and sociology focus on collective pri-
vate standard-setting activities, such as global private certification sys-
tems for consumer products.71  In addition to these collective
69 See discussion infra Part II.B.
70 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 18, at 46; Steven Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, R
Can Non-State Global Governance Be Legitimate?: An Analytical Framework, 1 REG. & GOVERN-
ANCE 347, 349–50 (2007) (identifying five key features of non-state market driven govern-
ance systems); see also Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker, The Emergence of Private
Authority in the International System, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 3, 4 (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002) (noting that the
functions undertaken by non-state actors include that “[t]hey set agendas, they establish
boundaries or limits for action, . . . they provide order and security[,] . . . [and] [t]hey act
simultaneously both in the domestic and in the international arenas”).
71 For example, certification systems have been described in the sociology literature
as “private regulation,” Tim Bartley, Certifying Forests and Factories: States, Social Movements,
and the Rise of Private Regulation in the Apparel and Forest Products Fields, 31 POL. & SOC’Y 433,
433–34 (2003), in the political science literature as “‘non-state market-driven’ govern-
ance,” BENJAMIN CASHORE ET AL., GOVERNING THROUGH MARKETS: FOREST CERTIFICATION
AND THE EMERGENCE OF NON-STATE AUTHORITY 4 (2004), or “private regulation,” David
Vogel, The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct, 49 BUS. & SOC’Y 68, 68 (2010), and
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standard-setting activities, I also include bilateral standard-setting in
the definition of private environmental governance, such as when pri-
vate supply chain contracts include provisions that are designed to re-
duce the environmental harms arising from the suppliers’ operations,
when a borrower agrees in a loan agreement to adopt an environmen-
tal management system, or when a community group enters into an
agreement with a local firm requiring toxics disclosures that exceed
federal, state, or local government standards.72  Collective or bilateral
standard-setting need not be motivated by altruism to be character-
ized as private environmental governance so long as it induces a pri-
vate entity to achieve a traditionally governmental objective (e.g.,
protection of a common pool resource or creation of a public good)
or to serve a traditionally governmental function (e.g., monitoring
and enforcement).
The common feature of the activities that I characterize as private
environmental governance is the development and enforcement by
private parties of requirements designed to achieve traditionally gov-
ernmental ends.73  Governmental bodies may encourage or discour-
age the formation and enforcement of these private requirements but
they do not participate in or control the outcome of these private re-
quirements to a substantial extent.74  Instead, private parties over-
come collective action barriers or bypass the need for collective action
altogether to achieve environmental protection.  Starting with this ad-
mittedly rough definition, I next provide examples that I argue qualify
as private environmental governance.
B. Examples of Private Environmental Governance
As with earlier developments in environmental governance, pri-
vate environmental governance activities are not the product of the-
ory preceding action.  Instead, they have emerged in many locales and
at scales ranging from local to global, leaving scholars to explain what
happened even though they do not fit neatly into analytical catego-
in the legal literature as “competitive supragovernmental regulation,” Errol Meidinger,
Competitive Supragovernmental Regulation:  How Could It Be Democratic?, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 513,
513 (2008), and “private sustainability governance,” Kenneth W. Abbott, Engaging the Public
and the Private in Global Sustainability Governance, 88 INT’L AFF. 543, 543 (2012).
72 See Vandenbergh, supra note 30, at 970. R
73 Private governance has been defined elsewhere as the “rules and structures by
which individuals, communities, firms, civic organizations, and other entities govern their
interests without the direct involvement of the state or its subsidiaries.”  Tracey M. Roberts,
Innovations in Governance: A Functional Typology of Private Governance Institutions, 22 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 67, 69 (2011).
74 Of course, some level of governmental involvement will induce legal institutions to
treat a private governance entity as a public entity. See Mark A. Cohen & Michael P.
Vandenbergh, The Potential Role of Carbon Labeling in a Green Economy, 34 ENERGY ECON. S53,
S60 (2012) (discussing the treatment of private systems by the international trade regime).
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ries.  Although some types fit easily into the types of local, closed com-
mons private ordering responses that Ostrom and others have
explained quite well, other types exist at global scales with resources
under great pressure and are hard to explain through the private or-
dering literature.  The discussion below does not attempt to include
all private governance activities, but it provides a brief overview of the
wide range of activities that can be characterized as private environ-
mental governance, and it demonstrates that a substantial number of
private actors are at least ostensibly participating.75  I begin with pri-
vate governance that involves collective standard-setting and then turn
to bilateral standard-setting.
1. Collective Standard-Setting
Certification and Labeling Systems.  Ecolabeling systems have grown
dramatically in the last two decades, and more than 400 are now in
existence around the world.76  Many of these labels are awarded to
products or services by non-governmental organizations that set stan-
dards, certify compliance, and allow certified products or services to
display a label.  Some of these certification and labeling systems are
designed, implemented, and funded by governments (e.g., the Nordic
Swan label), but many have little or no governmental involvement.
Much of the modern certification activity began soon after the
development of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), the leading
forest certification program.77  The FSC is an example of private gov-
ernance emerging to fill a gap after a period of government inaction.
Following the failure of efforts to negotiate a binding international
agreement on forest protection in the 1980s, environmental and
human rights groups turned their attention to creating standards for
well-managed forests.78  They induced a number of leading wood
75 Examples of private environmental governance activities that are not included in
the discussion are conservation easements and homeowner association environmental
covenants.
76 See TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 35, at 1 (citing ECOLABEL INDEX, R
www.ecolabelindex.com (last visited Aug. 31, 2013)).
77 See id. at 7.  Organic certification and labeling systems are widespread, but these
systems have been studied at length, and I focus here on other areas that may be less
familiar to legal audiences.
78 See Benjamin Cashore & Michael W. Stone, Can Legality Verification Rescue Global
Forest Governance?: Analyzing the Potential of Public and Private Policy Intersection to Ameliorate
Forest Challenges in Southeast Asia, 18 FOREST POL’Y & ECON. 13, 14 (2012) (noting that advo-
cacy groups promoted the FSC after “efforts to develop a binding global forest convention
at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit” failed); History: An Innovative Idea Takes Root, FOREST STEW-
ARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://ic.fsc.org/our-history.17.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2013); see also
Magali A. Delmas & Oran R. Young, Introduction: New Perspectives on Governance for Sustaina-
ble Development, in GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEW PERSPECTIVES 3, 8 (Magali A.
Delmas & Oran R. Young eds., 2009) (mapping private environmental governance systems
like the FSC); Errol Meidinger, Multi-Interest Self-Governance Through Global Product Certifica-
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products companies and traders to participate and established the
FSC in 1994.79  The FSC governing body consists of a wide range of
private stakeholders, sets standards for well-managed forests, and pro-
vides a certification based on private third-party verification.80  Forest
products harvested from certified forests are permitted to display the
FSC label.81  In response to concerns about some aspects of the FSC
system, the Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI), a competing group
with a stronger corporate focus, later emerged.82  In addition, the Pro-
gramme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC) was
formed in 1999 to provide a forest certification program for small for-
est owners.83
Forestry sustainability systems have been widely adopted around
the world.  Today, more than 14% of all temperate forests (9% of all
productive forests) around the world are certified to FSC and PEFC
standards.84  The PEFC certifies 244 million hectares of forest owned
by over 750,000 forest owners, and it includes over 9,700 firms in its
chain-of-custody program.85  The U.S. has over 8 million acres
(roughly 40% of private U.S. forest land) managed to FSC or PEFC
standards.86
The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) is another example of a
certification system that emerged as a result of a perceived gap in gov-
ernment action.87  The World Wildlife Fund and Unilever formed the
MSC in response to concerns about the sustainability of fisheries sup-
plying fish to consumer markets in Europe, but it is now a global or-
ganization.88  The MSC administers standards for sustainable fisheries,
updates the standards periodically with input from a stakeholder advi-
sory group, evaluates fisheries, and allows those fisheries that meet
certain criteria to label their fish as MSC-certified.89  As with the FSC,
tion Programmes, in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS: SELF-GOVERNANCE AND LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL
ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS 259, 260–70 (Olaf Dilling et al. eds., 2008) (explaining the trend
of having products certified through private inspections by using forestry as an example).
79 See History: An Innovative Idea Takes Root, supra note 78. R
80 See Governance: Built Upon the Principles of Participation, Democracy, and Equity, FOREST
STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://ic.fsc.org/governance.14.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2013).
81 See FSC Certification: Ensuring Environmental, Social, and Economic Benefits, FOREST
STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://ic.fsc.org/certification.4.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2013).
82 See SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY INITIATIVE, http://www.sfiprogram.org/ (last visited Aug.
27, 2013).
83 See PROGRAMME FOR ENDORSEMENT FOREST CERTIFICATION, http://pefc.org/ (last vis-
ited Aug. 27, 2013).
84 See sources cited supra note 35. R
85 See PROGRAMME FOR ENDORSEMENT FOREST CERTIFICATION, supra note 83. R
86 See TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 35, at A-114. R
87 See  id. at 21.
88 See MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, http://www.msc.org/ (last visited Aug. 27,
2013).
89 See About Us, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, http://www.msc.org/about-us (last vis-
ited Aug. 27, 2013).
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private auditors assess compliance with the MSC standards.  The MSC
not only enforces its private standards, but it explicitly builds on and
adds a private enforcement mechanism to applicable government
standards.  The MSC is a good example of the complex relationship of
public and private environmental governance.  The MSC was formed
by private organizations and does not operate under government con-
trol or with government funding, but one of its requirements for
sustainable fisheries is compliance with the nonbinding Code of Con-
duct produced by the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization.90
Today the MSC certifies roughly seven percent of the seafood
caught for human consumption in the world, and roughly sixty per-
cent of the seafood caught for human consumption from U.S. fisher-
ies is certified or is from fisheries that are under assessment for
certification.91  Firms such as Wal-Mart sell only wild-caught fish from
MSC-certified fisheries,92 and in 2013, McDonald’s announced that it
would sell MSC-certified fish at all U.S. locations.93  A mini-industry
has developed in the fisheries area, with for-profit and not-for-profit
firms providing technical assistance to fisheries attempting to make
improvements to satisfy the demands of large buyers for certified fish.
Private standards and labeling also have been developed in areas
of emerging importance.  For example, certification systems have
emerged for aquaculture in recent years with procedures, private stan-
dards, and implementation that follow roughly along the lines of the
FSC and MSC.  Aquaculture accounts for much of the increased sea-
food consumption that is accompanying global population growth.94
In 2011, total inland and marine aquaculture production was 63.6 mil-
lion tons,95 and in 2009, aquaculture accounted for 38% of all global
fisheries products.96  A significant portion of the wild catch is used for
fishmeal, however, so aquaculture provides nearly 50% of the global
catch intended for direct human consumption.97  At the global level,
approximately 2.6% of aquaculture production (1,339,000 metric
tons) is certified through third-party inspection each year.98
90 See id.
91 See TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 35, at A-75 R
92 See id. at A-74.
93 See McDonald’s USA First National Restaurant Chain to Serve MSC Certified Sustainable
Fish at All U.S. Locations, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.msc.
org/newsroom/news/mcdonalds-usa-first-restaurant-chain-to-serve-msc-certified-sustain
able-fish-nationwide.  McDonalds took the same action in Europe in 2011. See id.
94 See TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 35, at A-36. R
95 See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES
AND AQUACULTURE 3 (2012).
96 See TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 35, at A-37. R
97 See id. at A-37.
98 See id. at A-35.
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In addition, many other foods sold in international commerce
are subject to private certification and standards systems.  For exam-
ple, in 2010, approximately 20% of all bananas were sold under a cer-
tification scheme,99 and 8% of global coffee sales were sold as certified
while 17% of global coffee was produced as compliant with these stan-
dards.100  Between 2005 and 2010, global coffee certification grew by
433%.101  Similarly in 2010, 7.7% of global tea was sold as certified,
and between 2005 and 2010, global tea certification grew by 2000%.102
Lending Standards.  The Equator Principles are a set of environ-
mental assessment and disclosure requirements that major banks
agree to impose on project finance borrowers for projects around the
world.103  In project finance lending, the loaned funds are used for a
specific project and the project is expected to generate the revenues
that will enable repayment of the loan.  The project also serves as the
security for the loan.  Some of these projects (e.g., power plants and
pipelines) have raised environmental concerns, particularly in the de-
veloping world.  The Equator Principles emerged after protests by en-
vironmental groups and encouragement by the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) and World Bank induced several major banks to
agree on a common set of standards for environmental impact disclo-
sure and for managing the environmental risks arising from project
finance lending.104  The standards apply to global project finance
lending for loans of over ten million dollars.105
The Equator Principles require disclosure that is roughly analo-
gous to the information included in an environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA).106  Like NEPA, the implementation of the Equator
Principles often does not require any particular environmental out-
come, but the system relies on information development and disclo-
sure as a means of influencing which projects receive funding and the
design of those projects.  Unlike NEPA, however, the Equator Princi-
99 See id. at A-126.
100 See id. at 9 (“sold as certified” here refers to certification by UTZ Certified,
Rainforest Alliance, 4C, Fairtrade, organic, CAFE Practices, or Nespresso).
101 See id.
102 See id. For a recent analysis of kosher certification as a form of private regulation of
food production, see TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, KOSHER: PRIVATE REGULATION IN THE AGE OF
INDUSTRIAL FOOD (2013).
103 See About the Equator Principles, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://www.equator-principles.
com/index.php/about-ep/about-ep (last visited Aug. 31, 2013).
104 John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Global Banks as Global Sustainability Regula-
tors?: The Equator Principles, 33 LAW & POL’Y 542, 543–44, 558–59 (2011).
105 See EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://www.equator-principles.com (last visited Aug. 27,
2013); see also Conley & Williams, supra note 104, at 547–548; Andrian Lozinski, The Equator R
Principles: Evaluating the Exposure of Commercial Lenders to Socio-Environmental Risk, 13 GER.
L.J. 1490 (2012).
106 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
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ples also direct lenders to require borrowers to develop and imple-
ment plans to reduce environmental impacts.107  The Equator
Principles were initially adopted by a group of private banks, not gov-
ernment agencies, although the initial meeting of project finance
lenders was convened by the IFC.  The Equator Principles also draw
on and reference the IFC Performance Standards and the World Bank
Group Environmental, Health, and Safety Guidelines.  The Equator
Principles are administered by an unincorporated association of mem-
ber institutions (the EP Association), and they have been updated
twice through a remarkably elaborate public disclosure and comment
process that resembles informal notice-and-comment rulemaking.108
The Equator Principles have been widely adopted.  Roughly
eighty of the largest global financial institutions have now agreed to
comply.109  Project finance lending by member banks accounts for
more than seventy percent of global project finance lending in devel-
oping countries.110
Commodities Roundtables.  Many goods are sold in commodity mar-
kets (e.g., corn, wheat, and other grains), and the supply chains are
difficult to identify.  Consumer or interest group pressure on con-
sumer-facing businesses of the type that contributed to the develop-
ment of the FSC and MSC certification systems is unlikely to result in
changes in production methods for commodities, since food retailers
typically do not buy directly from the producers and the goods do not
have a clear consumer brand identity.  Despite the barriers to develop-
ment of private governance systems for commodities, environmental
groups, retailers, producers, and others have responded by forming
commodity roundtables for palm oil, cotton, and other commodities
in the last decade.  An example is the Roundtable on Sustainable
Palm Oil, which seeks to create an adequate chain of custody and to
certify suppliers of palm oil.111  As with many international private
governance initiatives, the private activities in this area include gov-
ernmental involvement in some cases and in others exist alongside
similar government initiatives.112
107 See Lozinski, supra note 105, at 1492. R
108 See The Equator Principles Association: Governance & Management, EQUATOR PRINCI-
PLES, http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/governance-and-management (last
visited Aug. 27, 2013); see also The Equator Principles III: 2013, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://
www.equator-principles.com/index.php/ep3 (last visited Aug. 27, 2013) (discussing the
new version of the Equator Principles (EP III)).
109 See About the Equator Principles, supra note 103. R
110 See id.
111 See Vision and Mission, ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, http://
www.rspo.org/en/vision_and_mission (last visited Aug. 27, 2013).
112 For example, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the
International Institute for Sustainable Development have formed the Sustainable Com-
modities Initiative (SCI), which is promoting the development of voluntary sustainability
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Commodity programs have developed a remarkable degree of
flexibility to account for the challenges arising from these goods.  For
example, GreenPalm is a program started by the World Wildlife Fund
that addresses palm oil and has combined environmental certification
with a trading system.113  Palm oil is an ingredient in nearly half of all
supermarket products, and these products often have blends of many
different types of palm oil.114  As a result, certifying only a subset of
palm oil producers will not result in large quantities of palm oil that
are totally from certified sources, and switching the entire supply
chain to sustainable palm oil would be difficult.  The GreenPalm plan
allows a business to obtain a certificate for every ton of palm oil it can
certify as sustainable.115  Businesses can then trade these certificates to
offset nonsustainable production.  Although this approach results in
products that have some noncertified palm oil being labeled as certi-
fied, it led to the production of one million tons of certified palm oil
in the first two years.116  This resulted in nine million dollars paid to
producers to stimulate the development of sustainable palm oil
production.117
Green Building Standards.  The private standards established by the
U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC), Leadership in Energy and En-
vironmental Design (LEED), influence the design and construction of
buildings in the United States.118  The LEED standards allow builders
to certify compliance with efficiency and environmental requirements
at several levels of stringency (Platinum, Gold, Silver, and Bronze).
The USGBC, a non-governmental organization, establishes, modifies,
and administers the LEED standards with input from stakeholder
groups.  The LEED process also involves private verification that is fi-
nanced in part by certification charges.119
As of 2012, LEED-certified buildings accounted for two billion
square feet of occupied space in the U.S.120  Additionally, the total
value of LEED-certified, non-residential construction projects in 2010
initiatives focused on commodity production with improved environmental, economic,
and social effects. See SUSTAINABLE COMMODITY INITIATIVE, http://sustainablecommodities
.org (last visited Aug. 27, 2013).  The SCI focuses not only on fungible commodities but
also on the other areas involving global supply chains that have been the subject of private
governance activity such as forests, fisheries, and carbon emissions. See id.
113 See GREENPALM, http://www.greenpalm.org (last visited Aug. 27, 2013).
114 See id.
115 See id.
116 See TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 35, at 55. R
117 See id.
118 See LEED, U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, https://www.usgbc.org/leed (last visited
Aug. 27, 2013) (LEED stands for Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design).
119 See id.
120 See U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, GREEN BUILDING FACTS 1 (2012), available at
http://www.usgbc.org/sites/default/files/Docs18693.pdf.
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was fifty-four billion dollars—thirty-five percent of the total market.121
Estimates project that LEED-certified projects will make up forty-eight
percent of the non-residential construction market by 2015.122  Advis-
ing clients on the LEED standards is now an important aspect of the
practice of law for many environmental and land use lawyers.123  In-
dustry groups now lobby the USGBC regarding the content of the
LEED standards in ways that might have been directed at Congress or
the Environmental Protection Agency two decades ago.124
The existence of the LEED standards provides an example of the
type of strategic shift that can occur when private governance is an
option.  A recent study demonstrated that most people mistakenly be-
lieve that using hot water when washing hands makes hands
cleaner.125  The study concluded that several million tons of green-
house gas emissions could be reduced by only supplying comfortable,
not warm or hot, water in building sinks.126  In past years, environ-
mental advocates might have drawn on this type of study to lobby fed-
eral, state, or local agencies, but today the lobbying may be more
appropriately directed at the USGBC for inclusion in the LEED stan-
dards for green buildings.
Environmental Management Standards.  Public and private organiza-
tions have developed standards for corporate environmental manage-
ment systems, and there are some indications from empirical studies
that these standards improve firm environmental compliance with en-
vironmental laws and overall environmental performance.127  Perhaps
the best-known environmental management standard is the Interna-
121 See HARVEY M. BERNSTEIN, MCGRAW HILL CONSTRUCTION, THE GREEN OUTLOOK
2011: GREEN TRENDS DRIVING GROWTH THROUGH 2015, at 6 (2010).
122 See id. at 7.
123 See, e.g., Jonathan C. Kinney & Timothy R. Hughes, Practice as a LEED-Accredited
Professional, VA. LAW. WKLY. (May 31, 2010), http://valawyersweekly.com/2010/05/31/
practice-as-a-leed-accredited-professional/ (discussing the logistics of LEED legal practice);
Climate Change, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, http://www.fulbright.com/index.cfm?fuseaction
=Description.subdescription&site_id=2046&id=1370 (last visited Aug. 28, 2013) (touting
the firm’s LEED practice).
124 See, e.g., Gabriel Nelson, Green Building: Major Overhaul of LEED Rating System Won’t
Happen in 2012, GREENWIRE (June 5, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059965405
(noting that the American Chemistry Council lobbied USGBC to reduce chemical disclo-
sure requirements in the LEED standard).
125 See generally Amanda R. Carrico, Micajah Spoden, Kenneth A. Wallston & Michael
P. Vandenbergh, The Environmental Cost of Misinformation: Why the Recommendation to Use
Elevated Temperatures for Handwashing is Problematic, 37 INT’L J. CONSUMER STUD. 433 (2013)
(discussing a study concerning the perception of hot water in hygiene).
126 See id. at 436–37.
127 See Cary Coglianese, The Managerial Turn in Environmental Policy, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 54, 71 (2008) (stating that “empirical research indicates that ISO-certified EMSs are
associated with at least modest compliance improvements”); Coglianese & Nash, supra note
33, at 9–12. R
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tional Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14001 standard.128  ISO
is principally a private standard-setting organization, although it does
include some governmental involvement.129  Firms use third-party au-
ditors to certify ISO 14001 compliance.  Although few nations require
firms to have environmental management systems in place, more than
267,000 firms around the world certified compliance with ISO 14001
as of 2011.130
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Gold Standard.  In 2003, the
World Wildlife Fund established the Gold Standard in response to
concerns that the CDM process established by the Kyoto Protocol was
allowing questionable practices to qualify as certified emissions reduc-
tions.131  The Gold Standard is an example of a private governance
initiative that is designed to complement or bolster a government pro-
gram.132  Government officials participated in various aspects of the
development of the Gold Standard, but non-governmental organiza-
tions adopted and administer the initiative.  These groups also started
a comparable program, the Voluntary Gold Standard, several years
later to address the voluntary carbon offset market.133  Although the
limitations of the Kyoto Protocol have adversely affected global car-
bon markets in recent years, more than half a billion dollars in carbon
offsets have been sold under these standards.134
Environmental Disclosure Standards.  Several private organizations
have emerged in the last two decades to gather and disseminate envi-
ronmental information.  Two leading examples are the Global Report-
ing Initiative (GRI) and the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP).135
Both organizations set standards for voluntary corporate disclosure of
128 See ISO 14000—Environmental Management, INT’L STANDARDS ORG., http://www.iso.
org/iso/home/standards/management-standards/iso14000.htm (last visited Aug. 28,
2013).
129 See David A. Wirth, The International Organization for Standardization: Private Voluntary
Standards as Swords and Shields, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 79, 95 (2009).
130 See INT’L STANDARDS ORG., THE ISO SURVEY OF MANAGEMENT SYSTEM STANDARD CER-
TIFICATIONS—2011, at 1 (2012), available at http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_survey2011_execu
tive-summary.pdf.
131 See Who We Are, GOLD STANDARD, http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/about-us/who-
we-are (last visited May 11, 2013).
132 For a discussion of how the Gold Standard and CDM work together, see generally
Kelly Levin et al., Can Non-State Certification Systems Bolster State-Centered Efforts to Promote
Sustainable Development Through the Clean Development Mechanism?, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
777 (2009).
133 See Who We Are, supra note 131. R
134 See ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE & BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN., DEVELOPING DIMEN-
SION: STATE OF THE VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETS 2012, at iii, available at http://www.forest-
trends.org/documents/files/doc_3164.pdf.
135 See About GRI, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, https://www.globalreporting.org/in
formation/about-gri/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2013); CARBON DISCLOSURE
PROJECT, https://www.cdproject.net/en-US/Pages/HomePage.aspx (last visited Aug. 28,
2013).
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pollutant emissions and maintain databases to make the information
publicly available.136  In both cases, large corporate firms and environ-
mental advocacy groups developed the standards and non-govern-
mental organizations administer the disclosure process.137
Corporate participation in these environmental disclosure pro-
grams is widespread.  More than 3,000 corporations reported environ-
mental performance data to GRI in 2010, and the reporting involved
many of the largest firms in industries with substantial environmental
impacts.138  Similarly, more than 1,000 corporations, including more
than eighty percent of the 500 largest firms on a global level, reported
their carbon emissions to the CDP in 2012.139
2. Bilateral Standard-Setting
Supply Chain Contracting.  Not all private governance mechanisms
involve collective standard setting.  Even though they are not required
to do so by any public or private standard, a growing number of cor-
porate buyers impose environmental requirements on their global
suppliers.140  In some cases, these requirements simply obligate the
buyer to comply with domestic environmental laws, but in many cases
the contract terms require the suppliers to exceed public regulatory
requirements.141  The parties to the contract may create the private
standard, or they may incorporate collective private standards such as
ISO 14001 or GRI reporting.
Contracts of this type may require suppliers to adopt an environ-
mental management system, to not use certain toxic chemicals, or to
reduce energy use or carbon emissions.  For instance, Hewlett-Pack-
ard imposes toxics use reduction requirements on all of its suppli-
ers.142  In a recent initiative, several leading footwear and apparel
companies have committed to eliminate toxic discharges from their
136 See sources cited supra note 135. R
137 See sources cited supra note 135. R
138 See Sustainability Disclosure Database, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, http://database.
globalreporting.org/search (last visited Aug. 28, 2013) (search for 2010 publications).
139 See CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, CDP GLOBAL 500 CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT 2012:
BUSINESS RESILIENCE IN AN UNCERTAIN, RESOURCE-CONSTRAINED WORLD 4, available at
https://www.cdproject.net/CDPResults/CDP-Global-500-Climate-Change-Report-2012.
pdf.
140 See, e.g., Gap Inc. Code of Vendor Conduct, at 5 (requiring all factories to “comply
with all applicable environmental laws and regulations,” among other things).
141 See, e.g., Starbucks Supplier Responsibility Standards: Manufactured Goods and Ser-
vices, at 3 (requiring vendors to have, among other things, “[w]ritten waste prevention,
waste reduction, recycling, energy conservation and greenhouse gas mitigation policies” as
well as “demonstrable evidence of implementation”).
142 See Supply Chain Responsibility, HEWLETT-PACKARD, http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/
globalcitizenship/society/supplychain.html (last visited Aug, 28, 2013).
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supply chains by 2020.143  Wal-Mart, meanwhile, imposes energy effi-
ciency requirements on its suppliers.144  Note that Wal-Mart does not
just demand lower prices from suppliers, which any firm can be ex-
pected to do in a private market transaction.  Instead, it demands less
energy use, which typically correlates with lower emissions of green-
house gases and other air pollutants.  The motivations are complex,
but the important aspect of the supply chain contracting in this case is
that it serves an environmental protection function (e.g., reducing air
pollution) that Wal-Mart has no public law obligation to address in its
supply chain contracts.
Supply chain contracts that impose environmental requirements
on suppliers are surprisingly common.  A study published in 2007 con-
cluded that more than half of the firms in eight industrial sectors im-
pose private environmental requirements on their suppliers.145  A
larger recent study of firms in many sectors concluded that roughly
forty percent of the firms surveyed reported that they impose such
requirements.146  Anecdotal reports suggest that private corporate
supply chain requirements imposed by major retailers on product
manufacturers are becoming the de facto constraints on the presence
of toxics in consumer products.147
In addition, the potential influence of supply-chain contracting
requirements is huge.  At least 65,000 multinational corporations
(MNCs) operate roughly 850,000 affiliates around the world, and sup-
ply-chain contracting occurs among these affiliates as well as with mil-
lions of third-party firms.148  Wal-Mart alone does eighteen billion
dollars per year in business with China, has over 10,000 Chinese sup-
pliers, and would be China’s eighth largest trading partner if it were a
country.149  Regardless of one’s views of Wal-Mart or its motivations
for imposing environmental requirements on suppliers, the potential
effects of Wal-Mart’s insistence on environmental performance over
143 See Roadmap to Zero Discharge of Hazardous Chemicals, ZDHC, http://www.
roadmaptozero.com (last visited Sept. 2, 2013).
144 See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 S. CAL. L. REV.
905, 939–40 (2008).
145 See Vandenbergh, supra note 30, at 916–17.  For a discussion of supply-chain con- R
tracts across several fields, see Li-Wen Lin, Legal Transplants Through Private Contracting:
Codes of Vendor Conduct in Global Supply Chains as an Example, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 714–16
(2009).
146 See SINGER & TONELLO, supra note 31, at 101. R
147 See, e.g., INSIDE E.P.A., supra note 32, at 6 (noting that in the absence of government R
toxics regulation, retailers are becoming the principal regulators).
148 See Vandenbergh, supra note 30, at 920. R
149 See Vandenbergh, supra note 144, at 939–40; A Welcome to Wal-Mart, DAILY BEAST R
(Dec. 19, 2004, 7:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2004/12/19/a-wel
come-to-wal-mart.html.
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and above its public legal requirements may be larger than many cur-
rent international or national regulatory measures.150
Other Commercial Agreements.  Environmental provisions are also
common in many commercial agreements other than supply chain
contracts.  The types of agreements that commonly include environ-
mental provisions include merger and acquisition agreements, real es-
tate sales contracts and leases, commercial loans, and environmental
insurance policies.151  The environmental activities conducted as a
part of commercial transactions and the legal obligations imposed in
the contracts entered into are at the outer periphery of common con-
ceptions of governance, but many of them involve a private party
whose actions achieve traditionally governmental objectives such as
CPR management, public good creation, or the reduction of environ-
mental externalities.  In some cases, contract provisions require one
or both parties to engage in environmental protection activities that
are beyond legal requirements.  For example, a 2005 study of loan
agreements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
concluded that more than seventy percent of the agreements in-
cluded environmental terms, and in many cases the lender required
the borrower to exceed compliance with public environmental laws
such as by not using particular chemicals, not using underground stor-
age tanks, or adopting environmental management systems.152  Simi-
larly, the study concluded that eighty percent of commercial leases
filed with the SEC included environmental provisions, often requiring
over-compliance.153
Even where commercial agreements simply require disclosure or
compliance with environmental laws, these provisions often are ac-
companied by and affect the scope of private environmental investiga-
tions.  For example, the 2005 study concluded that more than seventy
percent of the merger and acquisition agreements filed with the SEC
included environmental provisions.154  The investigations conducted
by private parties in connection with these agreements are often de-
150 See, e.g., Wan Xu & David Stanway, Wal-Mart, in China, Pushes Suppliers Down Green
Path, REUTERS (Oct. 25, 2012, 4:57 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/25/us-
walmart-china-idUSBRE89O0CE20121025.  An example of the relative size of Wal-Mart’s
potential emissions reductions is that its recent commitment to reduce supply-chain green-
house gas emissions by twenty million metric tons, WalMart Announces Goal to Eliminate 20
Million Metric Tons of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Global Supply Chain, WAL-MART (Feb. 25,
2010), http://news.walmart.com/news-archive/2010/02/25/walmart-announces-goal-to-
eliminate-20-million-metric-tons-of-greenhouse-gas-emissions-from-global-supply-chain, is
equivalent to almost a fifty percent reduction in the total emissions from the U.S. iron and
steel industry (forty-nine million tons). See U.S. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2006, at ES-9 (2008).
151 See Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 2045–64. R
152 See id. at 2051–52.
153 See id. at 2056.
154 See id. at 2045–46.
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signed to identify and limit liabilities to the buyer or seller, but they
resemble government enforcement inspections in many ways.  As a re-
sult, they have the effect of identifying existing or potential environ-
mental risks, and they often create private incentives to reduce those
risks.
Provisions in many types of commercial agreements also create
indemnities or require environmental insurance.155  These indemni-
ties often commit one party to take actions (e.g., prompt responses to
spills) or not take actions that would cause environmental harms (e.g.,
a commitment not to disturb areas with hazardous substances).  In-
demnities also induce one party to have an ongoing interest in, and
the legal right to monitor, the other party’s environmental behavior
for an extended period.  Insurance contracts regarding environmen-
tal risks also create incentives for the insurer to conduct environmen-
tal investigations before and during the term of the contract and to
demand changes in emissions or waste-handling practices.  Of course,
once the policy is in place, the insured may have less incentive to re-
duce the environmental harms of its behavior depending on the ex-
tent of credible threats of contractual sanctions or other enforcement
ranging from cancelling the policy to increasing rates at the time of
renewal.
The potential impact of private environmental governance associ-
ated with commercial transactions is hard to assess.  These agreements
not only create complex incentives, but also are often not publicly
disclosed, and the standard-setting, monitoring, enforcement, and ad-
judication related to environmental provisions only rarely are the sub-
ject of reported decisions or media accounts.156  As discussed at the
outset, however, one indication of the widespread nature of private
environmental governance associated with commercial transactions is
that the amount of money spent on private due diligence investiga-
tions (roughly $500 million per year) exceeds the total amount spent
on enforcement by the federal EPA (roughly $400 million per
year).157  The federal Superfund statute and other public laws served
as the initial stimulus for much of this due diligence activity, but the
activity now extends well beyond statutory compliance.  A second indi-
cation is the clear signaling in the Carbon Principles adopted by many
banks (discussed in Part III below) that participating lenders will be
evaluating the risks of lending to utilities during due diligence activi-
ties based on an assumption that there will be a substantial carbon
155 See id. at 2049–50, 2063.  The agreements studied for this analysis predate the for-
mation of the Carbon Principles and many are not project finance loans subject to the
Equator Principles.
156 See id. at 2069–73.
157 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. R
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price at some point.158  Another anecdotal indication is that almost all
of the top fifty law firms in the United States report that their environ-
mental lawyers are engaged in the investigations and drafting of con-
tracts for this type of private transactional environmental work.159
In addition, the widespread commercial activity in areas that typi-
cally involve environmental contract provisions is an indication of the
potential reach of private governance.  For example, mergers and ac-
quisition agreements commonly include environmental provisions,
and these types of transactions involved $795 billion in U.S. corporate
assets in a recent year.160  In years when the economy is expanding,
more than six percent of all manufacturing plants are involved in asset
sales or mergers and acquisitions.161  Commercial real estate sales in
any one year exceed tens of billions of dollars, and the value of com-
mercial space sold or leased in a recent year was $65 billion.162
Resource Agreements.  In some cases, multiple forms of private gov-
ernance emerge in response to a resource problem.  These responses
often involve supply-chain contracting, but they have distinctive fea-
tures because there is some collective activity among the buyers and
because the agreements are directed at a small number of large sup-
pliers who in turn are expected to regulate the conduct of a large
number of small enterprises.  For example, deforestation associated
with beef production is the largest source of carbon emissions in Bra-
zil and a substantial contributor to global emissions totals.163  The Bra-
zilian national and subnational governments have been unable to
combine the standards and enforcement necessary to address defores-
tation associated with cattle grazing.  After a campaign by an environ-
mental advocacy group in Europe, however, McDonald’s, Burger
King, Adidas, Nike, and other major global buyers of Brazilian beef
and leather entered into agreements with many of the major Brazilian
slaughterhouses in which the slaughterhouses agreed to phase out
purchases of beef from recently-deforested areas.164  A group of buyer
companies, suppliers, and environmental NGOs negotiated the agree-
ments, but they yielded a series of bilateral agreements between the
158 See CARBON PRINCIPLES, http://carbonprinciples.org (last visited Aug. 29, 2013).
159 See Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 2066. R
160 See id. at 2045.
161 See id.
162 See id. at 2056.
163 See AMAZON INST. FOR ENVTL RESEARCH, TROPICAL DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE
CHANGE 15 (Paulo Moutinho & Stephan Schwartzman eds., 2005).
164 See GREENPEACE, MINIMUM CRITERIA FOR INDUSTRIAL SCALE CATTLE OPERATIONS IN
THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON BIOME 1 (2009), available at http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/
Global/usa/report/2010/1/minimum-criteria-for-i.pdf (noting which slaughterhouses
made commitments); Alexei Barrionuevo, Giants in Cattle Industry Agree to Help Fight Defores-
tation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/07/world/americas/
07deforest.html?_r=0.
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companies and the suppliers rather than a common standard among
the companies.  The enforcement of these agreements remains to be
seen, and other buyers with less concern about deforestation may un-
dermine the agreements in the long run.  The agreements include a
large share of the Brazilian beef market, however, so even imperfect
implementation may yield substantial emissions reductions.165
Good Neighbor Agreements.  A less common but interesting form of
private environmental governance is memorialized in good neighbor
agreements.166  These agreements are often entered into when a cor-
poration operates an industrial facility that requires a high degree of
cooperation with the local community, whether for ongoing opera-
tions or to secure approvals for expansion.167  In a number of commu-
nities, local citizens have organized and negotiated with the local
management, agreeing to cooperate with the corporation in return
for extralegal concessions such as additional monitoring and disclo-
sure of toxic emissions, provision of parks and health care services,
and similar matters.
C. Summary
As the examples above suggest, the standard move from identify-
ing a collective action problem to evaluating public or public-private
sources of coercive authority misses a large number of private institu-
tional arrangements.  Private governance has emerged for a variety of
reasons and has a complex relationship with public governance.  In
some cases it may be a response to the failure of government to act
adequately or at all at the national and global levels (e.g., FSC and
MSC certification systems for forestry and fisheries).  The government
may have failed to act because of jurisdictional gaps (e.g., lack of inter-
national law regarding a global commons resource), the inability to
promulgate a sufficient law despite the existence of the authority to
do so (e.g., capture of a government by resource extraction interests),
or the lack of enforcement capacity (e.g., inadequately funded gov-
ernment enforcement agencies).  In other cases the government may
not act because a resource is an open commons or the regulatory
165 See Brazilian Beef Giants Agree to Moratorium on Amazon Deforestation, MONGABAY.COM
(Oct. 7, 2009), http://news.mongabay.com/2009/1007-greenpeace_cattle.html.
166 See DOUGLAS S. KENNEY ET AL., UNIV. OF COLO. SCH. OF LAW, EVALUATING THE USE OF
GOOD NEIGHBOR AGREEMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND COMMUNITY PROTECTION 5 (2004)
(identifying roughly fifty good neighbor agreements in the US), available at http://
reviewboard.ca/upload/project_document/EA0809-001_Good_Neighbor_Agreements_
Evaluation_Report.PDF; see also Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 2064–66 (discussing the R
prevalence and terms of good neighbor agreements).
167 See, e.g., Good Neighbor Agreement Between Shoreline Environmental Alliance et
al. and Unocal Refinery of Rodeo §§ 1.1, 1.2, 1.4 (Apr. 7, 1995), available at http://www.co.
contra-costa.ca.us/DocumentCenter/Home/View/7487 (providing for corporate facility
disclosure and other overcompliance activities).
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space is so crowded that a regulatory anti-commons problem exists.168
Private governance measures also may fill gaps in timing that arise
when a problem is identified but governmental processes require time
to generate and enforce public measures (e.g., private labeling re-
sponses to tuna-dolphin concerns and ozone depleters).
Private governance measures also may complement public gov-
ernance measures, offering incentives for higher performance (e.g.,
the CDM Gold program), or supplementing existing enforcement
(e.g., legality verification in supply chain contracting).  Corporate par-
ticipation in private governance may be an effort to undermine sup-
port for more stringent public governance in other situations.169  Not
surprisingly, governments have stimulated the development of private
governance in some cases (e.g., the role of the IFC in creating the
Equator Principles and the use of federal procurement standards to
buy certified goods) and have resisted it in others (e.g., some agency
and congressional responses to MSC certification of fisheries).
II
TOWARD A THEORY OF PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE
Private environmental governance is undertheorized.  In the
absence of a theory of private environmental governance to demon-
strate the coherence of the field, it is not surprising that private
environmental governance has received little attention in environ-
mental policy debates, the environmental legal literature,170 and text-
168 See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory
Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2003) (noting the regulatory commons and anti-commons
issues).
169 See Graeme Auld et al., The New Corporate Social Responsibility, 33 ANN. REV. ENV’T &
RESOURCES 413, 423 (2008) (arguing that Responsible Care was designed to deflect govern-
ment regulation after the Bhopal, India chemical release); Roberts, supra note 73, at R
89–93.
170 For exceptions, see Errol Meidinger, Private Import Safety Regulation and Transna-
tional New Governance, in IMPORT SAFETY: REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECON-
OMY 233 (Cary Coglianese, Adam M. Finkel & David Zaring eds., 2009); Gerrard, supra note
29 at 421; Dennis D. Hirsch, A Holistic Policy Agenda to Promote Green Business: Reflexive Law R
Fills the Gap, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. 10228, 10231–32 (2012) (examining whether the market
and common law can successfully encourage firms to pursue more environmentally
friendly strategies); Dennis D. Hirsch, Green Business and the Importance of Reflexive Law: What
Michael Porter Didn’t Say, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1063 (2010) (discussing the rise of “green busi-
nesses” in the United States); Heather Hughes, Enabling Investment in Environmental Sus-
tainability, 85 IND. L.J. 597 (2010) (discussing how commercial finance law can create
incentives for commercial actors to be more environmentally responsible); Eric W. Orts,
Climate Contracts, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 197, 228–31 (2011) (discussing how NGOs and private
companies have contributed to climate change regulation); Tracey M. Roberts, The Rise of
Rule Four Institutions: Voluntary Standards, Certification and Labeling Systems, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q.
107 (2013) (examining voluntary standards, certification and labeling systems and their
impact on the environment); Judd F. Sneirson, The Sustainable Corporation and Shareholder
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books.171  I argue that private environmental governance is a discrete,
coherent field that is worthy of being treated as a distinct area for
research, teaching, and practice.  Public environmental law remains
the principal cudgel to steer the behavior of firms, and private envi-
ronmental governance is not a panacea; however, private environmen-
tal governance is widespread and has a substantial effect on
environmental behavior and environmental quality.  Viewing it as a
discrete phenomenon can yield new perspectives on governance and
new options for some of the most intractable remaining problems.
My intent here is to generalize to the extent necessary to demon-
strate the common aspects of private environmental governance with-
out overclaiming about the common linkages among private
governance activities or the novelty and importance of this area.172  I
begin with a model of how private environmental governance re-
sponds to collective action problems and then discuss the relationship
between private environmental governance and the New Governance
scholarship.
A. The Private Environmental Governance Model
A simple model of the origins and functions of private environ-
mental governance can be developed from the examples presented
above.  This model describes the sources of incentives to achieve envi-
ronmental protection and why they may address collective action
problems even in the absence of government action.  The model sug-
gests that private environmental governance is not a substitute for
public governance but that it can fill temporal or other gaps in the
public governance response to environmental issues.
Many individuals have preferences for environmental protection
and resource stewardship, but first-order collective action problems
are a barrier.  The obstacles to achieving those preferences through
government action are substantial.  Voting and other forms of partici-
pation in the political process require significant effort to undertake,
and there are incentives to free ride.  Individuals report that engaging
in civic behavior regarding the environment is more difficult than en-
Profits, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 541 (2011) (defining “sustainable businesses” and outlaying
ways to increase their numbers); Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 2041–66 (examining pri- R
vate regulatory agreements focusing on environmental agreements); Annecoos Wiersema,
A Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and Goals in Environmental and Natural
Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239, 1253–55 (2008) (noting a trend in recent literature that
places a “strong emphasis on collaboration and a mix of private and public actors”).
171 See Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 2067.  Exceptions are DAVID HUNTER ET AL., IN- R
TERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (4th ed. 2011), and J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE
PRACTICE AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2nd ed. 2010).
172 See Mark A. Tushnet, A New Constitutionalism for Liberals?, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 357, 359 (2003) (noting concern about overclaiming).
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gaging in related market behavior.173  Perhaps because of preferences
for both environmental protection and small government, individuals
are more supportive of corporate action than government action to
respond to environmental threats on some topics.174  Even if an indi-
vidual engages in direct political participation, the checks and bal-
ances of government, lobbying by concentrated interests, race-to-the-
bottom issues, the limits of jurisdictional boundaries, and ideology
(e.g., a preference for small government), among others, all make it
difficult to induce government to act quickly to address an environ-
mental problem.  The dim prospects for success may induce an indi-
vidual to have a low sense of efficacy—the belief that an action will
achieve its intended effects—which in turn may reduce the likelihood
that the individual will participate in the political process.175
1. Small-Scale Private Ordering
Ostrom and others have demonstrated that individuals can use
private ordering to protect common pool resources and produce pub-
lic goods when they have adequate information, iterative relation-
ships, opportunities for social sanctions, and rewards, and when there
is limited pressure on the resource.  This often occurs in small groups
where these characteristics are easier to achieve than they are in large
groups.176  Several of the private environmental governance activities
discussed above fit reasonably easily into this category of small-group
responses to collective action problems.  For example, the situations
in which good neighbor agreements arise involve small groups, itera-
tive relationships, opportunities for informal sanctions, and adequate
information.  Small groups of individuals (often neighbors) act di-
rectly or form local advocacy groups based on concerns about the
near-term health and environmental threats of an industrial facility.
Those groups negotiate with a local factory on the terms of a good
neighbor agreement.  They have the ability to affect the reputation of
173 See Edward W. Maibach, Connie Roser-Renouf & Anthony Leiserowitz, Communica-
tion and Marketing as Climate Change-Intervention Assets: A Public Health Perspective, 35 AM. J.
PREVENTIVE MED. 488, 491–92, 498 (2008); see also Roberts, supra note 73, at 80 (discussing R
the role of civic organizations in environmental protection).
174 See YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N & GEORGE MASON UNIV. CTR. FOR
CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N, PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY POLICIES IN SEPTEM-
BER 2012, at 7, 12 (2012).
175 See Kenneth A. Wallston et al., Development of the Multidimensional Health Locus of
Control (MHLC) Scales, 6 HEALTH EDUC. MONOGRAPHS 160, 167–69 (1978) (distinguishing
between efficacy and locus of control).
176 See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 338, 382–83 (1997) (noting that small groups are not necessary for norm influence
if adequate information and opportunities for social sanctions exist); Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 359,
359–60, 365 n.31 (2003) (distinguishing group size and relationship among group
members).
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the factory in the community and  could also influence local govern-
ment land-use approvals or increase the risk of regulatory enforce-
ment by government agencies.
A feature that distinguishes private environmental governance
from the private ordering analyzed by Ostrom, Ellickson, and others is
the extent of the institutionalization or formalization of the response
to the collective action problem.  The small group private ordering
that has been the focus of extensive research to date tends to occur
through informal interactions among individuals (e.g., fishers),
whereas much of the private ordering that occurs in some of the pri-
vate environmental governance areas discussed above involves com-
mercial agreements between firms or agreements between a firm and
an advocacy group.  Although influential, the norms that drive the
behavior of lobstermen in Maine or farmers and cattle ranchers in
Shasta County, California are not typically committed to writing or
otherwise memorialized in ways that communicate the boundaries of
property rights or appropriate behavior to nonparticipants.  Private
organizations typically do not exist to develop, monitor, and enforce
the norms, and legal remedies are generally not available for norm
enforcement.  In contrast, good neighbor agreements and supply
chain contract provisions contain standards of conduct that are me-
morialized in writing (suggesting they are more stable and communi-
cated to a wider audience than is typical for informal norms) and may
be subject to enforcement in a private setting (e.g., a private dispute
resolution proceeding) or a public court.  Thus, some types of private
environmental governance involve an institutionalization or formali-
zation of the norms between two or more parties that distinguishes
these activities from other forms of small-scale private ordering.
2. Large-Scale Private Ordering
Many of the environmental preferences an individual may have
cannot be satisfied through small group interactions.  At least on the
surface, iterative relationships, opportunities for social sanctions and
rewards, and adequate information are all lacking.  The preference
may be to stop tropical deforestation activities by an unknown logger
3,000 miles away or to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from millions
of sources located in dozens of countries.  The problems are global in
scope, resulting in millions or billions of people who have incentives
to free ride on any mitigation measure (e.g., forests, fisheries, and cli-
mate).  The actors causing the harm are numerous and operate far
from those who might be harmed.  The individuals harmed often do
not directly interact with the actors causing the harm, much less have
iterative relationships, opportunities for social sanctioning, or access
to adequate information.  The resources are often under intense pres-
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sure (e.g., forests, fisheries and the atmosphere), and the problems
often cross international boundaries (regional or global air pollution)
or exist outside of any national boundaries (open-ocean fisheries).
Many of the private environmental governance responses identi-
fied above address these types of problems without coercive govern-
ment authority and are harder to explain based on the criteria for
private ordering outlined by Ostrom and others.  The private order-
ing literature has not developed solutions to these global problems,
and leading scholars often point instead to collections of local efforts,
often by governments.  For example, even if comprehensive interna-
tional climate agreements do not emerge, recent scholarship has
noted that government regime complexes or polycentric governance
may address the problem.177  Whatever form these noncomprehensive
responses take, however, the public response may not be sufficient to
satisfy public preferences for environmental protection, leaving room
for private environmental governance to address global and other
large scale problems.
Private certification and labeling systems directed at consumers
are a form of large-scale private ordering that may be able to over-
come the first-order and second-order collective action problems in
these situations for several reasons.  As to the first-order problem of
inducing an individual to act when the individual gains all of the ben-
efits but does not bear all of the costs of an action, labeling systems
begin by drawing on a reservoir of preferences or norms about envi-
ronmental harms among the individuals who buy the goods whose
production or use causes environmental harm.178  In some cases infor-
mation about the provenance or performance of goods will change
buying behavior.  Empirical studies of consumer preferences and be-
havior demonstrate that these preferences exist among a substantial
portion of the population, and they affect behavior in a variety of cir-
cumstances.179  Similar effects are likely among shareholders, employ-
ees, lenders, and others who influence firm behavior.  In addition, in
some cases shifts in purchasing behavior are perceived to be less costly
177 See VICTOR, supra note 16, at 1–2; Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime R
Complex for Climate Change, 9 PERSP. ON POL. 7, 7 (2011); Ostrom, supra note 8, at 550.  An R
exception is Richard B. Stewart, Michael Oppenheimer & Bruce Rudyk, Building a More
Effective Global Climate Regime Through a Bottom-Up Approach, 14 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
273, 281–82 (2013), which includes private governance options among a group of “bottom-
up” strategies.
178 See Cohen & Vandenbergh, supra note 74, at S56–S60 (reviewing literature on con- R
sumer preferences for green goods).  This may occur directly through shifts in consumer
demand (by changing the goods bought in the near term) or indirectly through consumer
influence (by changing the reputation of a brand or company and thus the goods bought
over the long term). See TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 35, at ES-18, 6. R
179 See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Mark A. Cohen, Climate Change Governance: Bounda-
ries and Leakage, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 221, 221–92 (2010) (citing studies).
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(in terms of time, effort, and money) than participation in the politi-
cal process.180
To the extent environmental protection is in a consumer’s pref-
erence set, labeling systems provide the information about the prove-
nance and performance of the good necessary to enable the
consumer to act on the preference.181  If these systems are large
enough to take advantage of economies of scale or if the reduction of
environmental harms also produces efficiencies, the additional cost to
the consumer of the substitute good or of not purchasing a good may
be small.  Even though consumer demand, as measured by willingness
to pay for green goods, is often limited, firms also respond to more
generalized concerns about firm or brand reputation.  Consumer in-
fluence thus may shift firm behavior even if consumer demand is lim-
ited.182  The limited cost of acting and responsiveness of firms
provides individuals with a sense that other individuals are also likely
to act based on the label, thus increasing the individual’s sense of effi-
cacy—the individual is more likely to believe that the behavior, when
combined with the likely behavior of others, will have some effect on
the intended outcome.  In turn, this sense of efficacy may increase the
likelihood that the individual will act.
The important point is that no further collective action is neces-
sary by the individual to overcome the first-order problem.  Simply
opting for a labeled good in purchasing decisions will have some ef-
fect on the intended outcome.  Although the effect may be small, it
may be the only way an individual can act on his or her preferences if
the government is unable or unwilling to act.  It also may enable indi-
viduals to avoid the cognitive dissonance that may arise if there is a
conflict between their preferences for environmental protection and
their behavior.183  If even just a fraction of all individuals gain norma-
tive rewards by purchasing goods with a positive environmental prove-
nance or performance, and if firms respond to marginal consumer
behavior, private governance efforts may have important effects on
firm behavior.
Even if the first-order problem is easier to resolve than it appears
on the surface, the second-order collective action problem identified
180 See Maibach, Roser-Renouf & Leiserowitz, supra note 173, at 498. R
181 See Mario F. Teisl et al., Can Eco-Labels Tune a Market? Evidence from Dolphin-Safe
Labeling, 43 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 339, 339 (2002).
182 See TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 35, at A-194. R
183 Interestingly, perhaps because of his focus on the role of individuals in affecting
government as opposed to their participation in markets in ways that have governance
implications, Mancur Olson considered but dismissed one aspect of individual behavior
that may be a key to understanding the emergence of global private governance: the pref-
erences of individuals for environmental outcomes and their ability to act on those prefer-
ences even if little or no collective action has occurred. See OLSON, supra note 51, at 160 R
n.91.
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by Mancur Olson is still a concern: How will individuals organize into
groups to develop the standards, certification verification, and label-
ing necessary for many of these systems to function if individuals have
incentives to free ride?  Several attributes of certification and labeling
systems may explain why the second-order collective action problem
has been overcome in many situations.  The amount of collective ac-
tion necessary may be surprisingly low, and it may be easier for advo-
cacy groups to address second-order collective action problems using
these types of private governance rather than public governance.  Per-
haps most important, so long as some level of preference for environ-
mental protection is held by a nontrivial portion of the population,
the production and dissemination of information may be all that is
necessary to create a threat that consumer behavior will shift, and
public information campaigns may be cheaper than lobbying govern-
ment to regulate.  Advocacy groups can supply that information indi-
rectly, by inducing the media to investigate and publicize
environmental issues, or directly, by conducting and publicizing their
own investigations or by forming various types of standards and label-
ing systems.  A large share of the market may be shifted by directing
campaigns at a visible industry leader rather than at many firms, in-
ducing the initial target to push for others to join to raise rivals’ costs
and improve the reputation of the sector.  Participation by the most
resistant industry participants may not be necessary for some improve-
ment to be made in the underlying conditions.  The effort also may
leave the more expensive behavior change efforts (e.g., shifting the
behavior of the lowest-performing firms) to government, if any action
is taken against them at all.
Perhaps most important, although the global nature of some
problems may vastly increase the number of parties at both ends (the
supplying firms and the consumers) as well as the physical distance
between the parties, small groups with iterative relationships and op-
portunities for social sanctioning among the participants may be sur-
prisingly common.  For some goods, a small group of large global
corporate producers exists, as does a small group of global advocacy
groups.184  The corporations typically have an executive responsible
for environmental matters, and that executive functions in an iterative
way with the leaders of advocacy groups.  Reputation matters so long
as the advocacy groups have the ability to mobilize private or public
184 On a related note, certification systems and some other voluntary systems can be
thought of as converting collective goods into club goods. See Matthew Potoski & Aseem
Prakash, Green Clubs and Voluntary Governance: ISO 14001 and Firms’ Regulatory Compliance, 49
AM. J. POL. SCI. 235, 235 (2005); Roberts, supra note 73, at 86; see also VICTOR, supra note 16, R
at 23–24 (noting the importance of clubs at nation-state level).
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threats to the firm and firms have the ability to affect the likelihood
that advocacy groups will target them.
The funding of advocacy efforts is a substantial problem, but to
avoid reputational harm, disruptions in activities, or unwanted regula-
tory attention, the corporate environmental executive may interact
frequently with some advocacy group leaders.185  To the extent advo-
cacy groups lack financial resources, they need not obtain contribu-
tions from large numbers of individuals; instead they can obtain
funding from foundations and from their proposed targets.  Obvious
conflicts may arise from funding by regulated firms, but the effects of
these conflicts are constrained somewhat by the professional, per-
sonal, and social norms of participating experts and advocacy group
members, and by the transparency of the process.186  The certification
and labeling programs that have arisen in these situations include the
FSC, MSC, and others.  Foundations have incentives to provide the
initial funding necessary to induce cooperation among the parties, al-
though the sources of long-term funding remain unclear in many
cases and the long-term financial viability of these organizations is an
important issue.187
For environmental problems caused by the production of goods
sold in international commerce, private governance may have particu-
lar advantages.  Private governance systems address global CPR issues
by shifting the target of collective action efforts.  Instead of seeking to
induce collective action from multiple, small harvesters who are un-
known to retail consumers and thus largely immune to direct market
pressure, a non-profit can focus on a smaller number of large, visible
firms that buy from the harvesters.  Government may not be able to
act because the problem occurs outside of any national boundary
(e.g., open oceans) or occurs inside the boundary of another nation.
National governments have little ability to regulate environmental be-
havior in other countries, and the international trade regime makes it
difficult to impose requirements on goods based on the characteristics
of the process by which they are produced, as opposed to the charac-
185 To some extent, the surprisingly iterative firm-advocacy group interactions that oc-
cur despite large geographic distances may resemble the interactions among traders. See
Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond
Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115 (1992) (discussing the system of private governance
among diamond merchants); Robert Cooter & Janet T. Landa, Personal Versus Impersonal
Trade: The Size of Trading Groups and Contract Law, 4 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 15, 15–16 (1984)
(discussing the relationship between trading group size and contracts).
186 Reliance on private funding and assurance services raises many of the same conflict
issues as relying on professional accountants.  The private accounting system is certainly
imperfect, but it functions reasonably well when compared to the viable alternatives.
187 See TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 35, at 13. R
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teristics of the finished good.188  Even government disclosure require-
ments receive skeptical treatment from trade dispute resolution
bodies, which are often more concerned about avoiding trade barriers
than environmental harms.189  The demand for environmentally pref-
erable goods is an incentive for corporate buyers to impose standards
on producers across national boundaries, however, and private efforts
to shift demand to meet environmental concerns may be able to cross
national boundaries without triggering the jurisdiction of the interna-
tional trade regime.190
B. Private Environmental Governance and New Governance
Although a robust literature has developed in political science,
international relations, and sociology,191 few legal scholars in the
United States focus on private environmental governance.  Perhaps a
reason for the limited legal work is that legal scholarship in the
United States draws more from economics than other social sciences.
With the exception of the private ordering work discussed above, the
role of private environmental governance has not attracted much at-
tention among law and economics scholars.192  Private environmental
governance arises through interactions between corporate firms and
their customers or between corporate firms and nongovernmental or-
ganizations regarding market behavior, and these private–private in-
teractions may be viewed as just another form of market behavior.  Yet
private governance activities are distinct from typical market behavior
in the way they reflect private preferences for the management of
common pool resources, the creation of public goods, and the reduc-
tion of negative externalities.  They also are distinct from other forms
of norm-driven private ordering in the extent to which the standards
of conduct are institutionalized or formalized and the extent to which
188 See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 526, 529 (2004).  For a discussion of the
consumer role in sustainable consumption, see James Salzman, Sustainable Consumption and
the Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 1243 (1997).
189 See Marcy Nicks Moody, Note, WARNING: MAY CAUSE WARMING: Potential Trade
Challenges to Private Environmental Labels, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1403 (2012).
190 See id.; see also Cohen & Vandenbergh, supra note 74, at S59 (discussing trade issues R
in carbon labeling).
191 See, e.g., Auld et al., supra note 169, at 413; Delmas & Young, supra note 78, at 3. R
192 The work of Tom Lyon is a notable exception. See Thomas P. Lyon. & John W.
Maxwell, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Environment: A Theoretical Perspective, 1 REV.
ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 1 (2008); see also Jason S. Johnston, Signaling Social Responsibility: On
the Law and Economics of Market Incentives for Corporate Environmental Performance (May 11,
2005), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1070&context=
upenn_wps.  For a recent review of the economics of corporate social responsibility, see
Markus Kitzmueller & Jay Shimshack, Economic Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity, 50 J. ECON. LIT. 51 (2012).
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the activity influences the behavior of large, geographically distant
groups.
At the same time, public law scholars may not view private–private
actions as sufficiently government-like to be worthy of attention, even
if the actions achieve governmental ends or perform governmental
functions.  Administrative law and other public law scholars typically
focus on the effectiveness, accountability, and legitimacy of positive
law regimes, not on private contracting or ordering.193  Private envi-
ronmental governance addresses environmental quality and other
public goods, a core function of public law, but it does not use the
coercive power of the state or draw on democratic institutions for its
legitimacy.  It is unclear whether private governance institutions
should be held accountable in the traditional public law sense if they
are not exercising the coercive power of government.194  Administra-
tive law and environmental law are closely intertwined,195 and environ-
mental law emerged as a positive law field dominated by
administrative law issues.  Starting with this conception of environ-
mental law, the actor responding to an environmental problem is gov-
ernment, and the options face the constraints inherent in
government.196  Private environmental governance thus may fall be-
tween the cracks of most private and public law scholarship.
One strand of scholarship has focused on the importance of pub-
lic–private interactions and on the importance of the kind of adaptive,
reflective institutions that often appear as a part of private environ-
mental governance.  This work, which is sometimes lumped under the
term New Governance, has many variants but several features of the
scholarship are important for understanding what is new—and not
new—about private environmental governance.197  In addition, the
193 See Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 2031–32.  More recently, Eric Orts has examined R
some forms of private governance as private contracting. See Orts, supra note 170, at 197. R
194 For a discussion, see Benjamin Cashore, Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environ-
mental Governance: How Non-State Market-Driven (NSMD) Governance Systems Gain Rule-Making
Authority, 15 GOVERNANCE: INT’L J. POL’Y ADMIN. & INSTITUTIONS 503, 503–04 (2002);
Vandenbergh, supra note 30, at 959–60. R
195 As Richard Lazarus has noted, “[i]t is fair to say that the reformation of modern
administrative law occurred primarily on an environmental law slate.” LAZARUS, supra note
11, at 114. R
196 See, e.g., id. at 29 (“Environmental protection law, like any area of law, must work
within the constraints and exploit the opportunities provided by this constitutional design
for lawmaking, as well as by related political processes.”).  Also, “[t]he core regulatory pre-
mise of much environmental protection law today is the sovereign’s police power to regu-
late private activities that adversely affect public health and welfare.” Id. at 50.
197 For an overview, see generally Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal
Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV.
471, 496 (2004); Jason M. Solomon, New Governance, Preemptive Self-Regulation, and the Blur-
ring of Boundaries in Regulatory Theory and Practice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 591; David M. Trubek &
Louise G. Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transfor-
mation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539 (2007); Neil Walker & Gra´inne de Bu´rca, Reconceiving Law
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emergence of private environmental governance may help answer
some of the unanswered questions regarding New Governance and
may suggest new ways to make its solutions more attractive to public
and private policymakers.
Brad Karkkainen has noted that New Governance can be distin-
guished from standard regulatory approaches because it “aspires
instead to be more open-textured, participatory, bottom-up, consen-
sus-oriented, contextual, flexible, integrative, and pragmatic.”198  In
some variants it also aspires to develop responses to public problems
that are more adaptive than traditional public government regulation
and administration.199  For example, democratic experimentalists sug-
gest that agencies form “the continuing organized link between the
national and the local, helping to create through national action the
local conditions for experimentation.”200  The New Governance litera-
ture has focused attention on areas where standard regulatory instru-
ments and agencies are failing and has proposed reforms designed to
produce greater collaboration and openness.201  This form of New
Governance scholarship suggests a more flexible approach than the
one that emerged from the New Deal-era laws and agencies, and from
the explosion of new environmental regulatory activity during the
1970–1990 period.  But it stops short of viewing purely private organi-
zations as the initiators of governance activities or the source of coer-
cive authority to solve collective action problems, as is common with
private environmental governance.  In addition, it assumes that gov-
ernment is able to muster the laws and programs necessary to create
incentives for public-regarding behavior by polluters, whether corpo-
rate firms or individuals.202  Private governance may provide new op-
& New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 519 (2007).  The study of governmental delegation
of regulatory functions to private parties is not new. See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by
Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 212 (1937) (noting that “public administrations . . .
should not be the exclusive method of regulation”).
198 Karkkainen, supra note 197, at 474; see also John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock, R
Introduction: Hard Choices and Soft Law in Sustainable Global Governance, in HARD CHOICES,
SOFT LAW: VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERN-
ANCE 3, 6–7 (John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2004) (discussing the role of soft
law in global environmental governance).
199 See Charles Sabel et al., Beyond Backyard Environmentalism, in BEYOND BACKYARD EN-
VIRONMENTALISM 3, 13–16 (Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers eds., 2000); Daniel J. Fiorino,
Rethinking Environmental Regulation: Perspectives on Law and Governance, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 441, 443 (1999).
200 Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM.  L. REV. 267, 345 (1998); see also id. at 287, 346 (proposing processes to expand
information and learning in a new “public sector model of problem solving”).
201 See id.  Karkkainen notes that “transparency, accountability and discipline” are
maintained through “benchmarking comparisons and regulation through benchmarking.”
Karkkainen, supra note 197, at 485 n.49 (internal quotations and citations omitted). R
202 The Renew Deal concept reflects this view.  It notes the importance of coercion but
provides limited explanation of the source of the incentives to engage in prosocial behav-
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tions for achieving traditionally governmental ends when government
is unable to act.
In a second variant, reflexive law advocates focus on the impor-
tance of dynamic, reflexive self-regulation.203  This work adds value by
noting the importance of flexibility and of self-regulatory activity to
increase regulatory efficiency.  At the same time, reflexive law theories
often give limited attention to the source of the incentive for self-regu-
lation.204  To the extent reflexive approaches assume that the underly-
ing pressure to reduce environmental harms arises from government
regulation or liability schemes, reflexive regulation may miss an im-
portant additional source of coercion: the role of private preferences
and private institutions as sources of incentives to self-regulate or to
submit to private regulatory systems.205
In the last decade, many federal and state agencies have focused
more on challenges to the authority and legitimacy of government
regulation than on fine-tuning post-New Deal regulatory instruments.
An environmental agency is unlikely to seize on available flexibility to
modify a rule to adapt to changing conditions if opening up an old
rule will subject the agency to pressure not to achieve the underlying
environmental outcome.  For regulators, this is the central challenge
to the concept of adaptive management.206  Adaptation is essential,
but how can it occur in ways that achieve more effective or efficient
environmental protection, not just less environmental protection?  Os-
trom noted that strong pressure on a resource can undermine private
ordering, and strong pressure exists in the extreme for climate
change, fracking, and a number of other environmental issues.  Iden-
tifying the source of sufficient coercive authority to shift corporate be-
havior may be as important for many environmental problems as
identifying avenues for flexibility and adaptation, and private govern-
ior. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contem-
porary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004).
203 See Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1231–32
(1995).
204 This is the basis for criticisms of reflexive and other New Governance approaches
from scholars such as Rena Steinzor, and it may be the reason why some of the more
innovative New Governance reforms have stalled in recent years. See Sidney A. Shapiro &
Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and Regulatory Metrics, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1741–42
(2008).  For example, many habitat conservation plans have not incorporated the adaptive
management, monitoring, and reporting requirements that made them attractive options
to standard application of the ESA. See Karkkainen, supra note 197, at 495. R
205 See Orts, supra note 203, at 1231–32. R
206 For a discussion of adaptive management, see J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman,
Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV. 424 (2010).  Overcoming the concern
about one-way ratchets also may be necessary to wider uptake of proposals such as Dorf and
Sabel’s democratic experimentalist idea of mandatory minimum performance standards
that are periodically revised. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 200, at 350–56. R
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ance may provide additional options that are both coercive and
flexible.
A third type of New Governance focuses on the importance of
contracts and cooperative governance.  When New Governance schol-
ars refer to contracting, however, the contracting parties typically are
the government and a regulated party.  Examples include Habitat
Conservation Plans (HCP) under the Endangered Species Act and the
understandings reached in a variety of regulatory flexibility initia-
tives.207  The contracting out of governmental functions and the coop-
erative governance that arises out of public-private contracts are of
interest to public law scholars and particularly those writing in the
area of New Governance,208 but the private–private interactions that
characterize private environmental governance thus far have re-
mained largely off the radar screen.  To the extent these private activi-
ties are simply knock-on effects of public laws, public law scholars can
account for them by using more expansive analyses of the effects of
public laws.209  For example, many of the incentives for private envi-
ronmental governance in commercial transactions arise from public
environmental laws and tort law.  Yet missing from the standard public
law account of environmental law, even as updated by the New Gov-
ernance scholarship, is the independent regulatory role often played
by private actors, not just public agencies or public–private hybrids.
When private parties manage common pool resources, supply envi-
ronmental public goods, or reduce negative externalities by playing
the standard-setting, implementing, monitoring, and enforcing func-
tions traditionally reserved for the government, these private activities
are worthy of attention by public law scholars.210
Private environmental governance can be viewed as a distinct new
field or as a new subfield of New Governance that explains the origin
and functioning of private–private responses to environmental
problems.  For the most part, the New Governance enterprise is still
about fixing government, not about building parallel institutions that
can pursue governmental objectives or serve governmental functions
207 See Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 194–95 (2000)
(viewing private contracting via HCPs as a form of cooperative governance); Sabel et al.,
supra note 199, at 30–36 (viewing contracting via HCPs as a form of democratic R
experimentalism).
208 See, e.g., Freeman & Minow, supra note 25 (discussing the contracting out of govern- R
ment functions); Freeman, supra note 207; Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environ- R
mental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 73–75 (2001) (discussing government-private
sector contracting as a form of environmental law reform).
209 See Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 2090–91. R
210 See id. at 2043; see also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 18, at 46 (identifying governmen- R
tal roles).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-1\CRN103.txt unknown Seq: 47 12-NOV-13 14:03
2013] PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 175
without government.211  The emphasis on flexibility and participation
in New Governance scholarship is attractive so long as it is coupled
with a sufficient ability to act quickly and to coerce recalcitrant parties
when problems require swift responses and the parties resist softer
forms of pressure.  New Governance offers important reforms in areas
where the regulated community is numerous, the issues are complex
and rapidly changing, and the government has the political power to
coerce.  Well-designed private environmental governance options may
be able to provide additional sources of coercive authority to shift cor-
porate behavior without undermining the flexibility central to many
New Governance measures.
III
OBJECTIONS
A number of reasonable objections can be raised to the claim
that private environmental governance represents a discrete, impor-
tant new field.  In addition, some private environmental governance
activities seem to touch a nerve at both ends of the political spectrum,
provoking surprisingly sharp reactions from pro-environmental and
pro-business advocates.  Some environmental advocates assert that pri-
vate governance is greenwashing that will have negative spillover ef-
fects on public governance.212  At the same time, some business
advocates assert that private governance will reduce corporate effi-
ciency or consumer choice, or will generate too much environmental
protection or unintended negative consequences.213  I examine sev-
eral leading objections below.
A. Is Private Environmental Governance a Coherent Concept?
As with many fields, a number of activities easily qualify as private
environmental governance, while others are less clear at the margins.
I first examine the boundaries of private environmental governance
and then discuss why lumping the various types of private environ-
mental governance under one umbrella is coherent and adds value to
legal scholarship and teaching.
211 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Triangulating the Future of Reinvention: Three Emerging Mod-
els of Environmental Protection, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 61, 61–62 (noting the use of New Govern-
ance ideas for government regulatory flexibility initiatives).
212 See Jennifer Jacquet et al., Seafood Stewardship in Crisis, 467 NATURE 28, 29 (2010);
Daniel Zwerdling & Margot Williams, Conditions Allow for More Sustainable-Labeled Seafood,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 12, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/02/12/
171376617/conditions-allow-for-more-sustainable-labeled-seafood.
213 See Bob Lurie, Wal-Mart’s Green Strategy Raises Serious Issues, HARVARD BUS. REVIEW
BLOG NETWORK (June 30, 2010, 1:20 PM), http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2010/06/why_you_
should_worry_about_wal.html.
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Boundaries.  To constitute private environmental governance, an
activity must be “private” and must involve “governance.”  A vast litera-
ture has explored whether the public–private distinction is meaning-
ful for legal scholarship, and I do not intend to add to that literature,
but it is important to clarify what distinguishes private governance
from the public governance that dominates the thinking of environ-
mental policymakers and scholars.  I first examine the private versus
public distinction and then turn to which activities qualify as govern-
ance versus simple market activity.
For many environmental activities, the boundary between public
and private is reasonably clear.  For my purposes, the important point
is that public governance typically claims legitimacy based on the con-
sent of the governed.214  The actual or imputed consent then enables
the government to claim and exercise powers such as the develop-
ment and enforcement of civil and criminal public laws and the adju-
dication of disputes.  At the nation-state level, the claim of
governmental authority enables the nation-state to claim a mono-
poly on the ability to engage in activities such as conducting foreign
policy and declaring war, but it also limits the extent to which other
nation-states can interfere with the activities within other states.
Private institutions perform many of the same functions as gov-
ernments, but they typically do not claim to have been expressly or
implicitly granted the authority to govern others without their per-
sonal consent.  Substantial repercussions may arise from not comply-
ing with a private standard, but in theory firms and individuals must
only comply if they have agreed to do so.  As a general rule, private
organizations have limited ability to coerce those who have not agreed
to be coerced, and the remedies of private organizations generally do
not include civil or criminal sanctions enforced by a governmental
body.215  This lack of coercive authority imposes a ceiling on the influ-
ence of private environmental governance activities.  At the same
time, because they lack the imprimatur of a national entity, private
governance activities may take less time to develop, raise fewer sover-
eignty concerns, and be subject to fewer constraints when their activi-
ties cross national boundaries.
Most of the activities I have identified as forms of private environ-
mental governance fit quite easily into the private end of the spec-
trum.  Many environmental certification systems such as the FSC and
MSC were organized and are operated and funded with little or no
governmental involvement.  Similarly, few would claim that supply
chain contracts or other commercial transactions entered into by two
214 See, e.g., Peter Newell et al., Multiactor Governance and the Environment, 37 ANN. REV.
ENV’T & RESOURCES 365, 365 (2012) (reviewing literature on “multiactor governance”).
215 See Roberts, supra note 73, at 125. R
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corporations are a form of public activity, even if they address environ-
mental protection.
In the middle of the public–private spectrum, however, a ques-
tion arises about the level of government involvement that can cause
an activity conducted largely by private parties to be treated as public.
If government is involved in funding the formation of a standard, con-
vening the private participants for standard-setting, implementation,
the use of the standard in procurement, and other activities, at some
point the activity begins to function more like a public–private hybrid
or quasi-public regulatory program.  Thus, on the margin, some orga-
nizations and activities challenge the notion of purely public laws and
institutions.  An example is the Equator Principles, which private
banks formed following pressure from both environmental advocacy
groups and quasi-public institutions such as the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) and the World Bank.216  The limited government
role in the implementation of the Equator Principles makes it difficult
to argue that the Equator Principles are a form of public governance,
or even a public–private hybrid, but quasi-governmental organizations
played a role in their formation.
A closer call is the ISO 14001 environmental management stan-
dard, which was developed by an international decision-making body
that has public and private members.  Standards issued by ISO do not
have the force of law, but many supply chain contracts require compli-
ance with ISO 14001 management standards, and some governments
may require compliance with the ISO 14001 standard in compliance
agreements.  The international trade regime addresses this ambiguity
by treating private standard-setting and enforcement as government
action in some situations.217  As discussed above, the New Governance
scholarship has noted the importance of public–private hybrids for
understanding public governance.  Although standards such as ISO
14001 and organizations such as ISO can fairly be characterized as
public, private, or public–private hybrids, important insights arise
from viewing them as a form of private governance (e.g., they enable
public and private advocates to ask not “what can government do?”
but “what can some organization do?”).
The question of when a private organization can be fairly said to
be engaging in governance is more difficult.  The easiest case involves
any one of the growing number of organizations such as FSC and MSC
that are formed to improve the management of a resource such as
forests or fisheries and that develop collective standards and certify
compliance with the standards.  If several companies and advocacy
groups agree on an environmental standard, secure funding from pri-
216 See supra notes 105–10 and accompanying text. R
217 See Cohen & Vandenbergh, supra note 74, at S59. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-1\CRN103.txt unknown Seq: 50 12-NOV-13 14:03
178 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:129
vate foundations, set up an organization to manage implementation
of the standard, provide for private compliance auditing, certify com-
pliance, and adjudicate disputes, then the organization is pursuing
traditionally governmental objectives and performing governmental
functions, and it fits squarely within the definition of private govern-
ance.  Organizations such as FSC and MSC follow this basic pattern of
collective standard-setting and implementation.218
Not surprisingly, the processes for revising private standards used
by these organizations quite closely track the core procedural ele-
ments mandated for informal rulemaking by federal agencies under
the Administrative Procedure Act.  A lawyer trained in administrative
law would be far more comfortable advising a private certification or-
ganization in its standard-setting operations than would a lawyer
trained in corporate transactions.  For example, the secretariat man-
aging the second set of revisions to the Equator Principles (called
“EPIII”) published a draft with proposed changes, included an expla-
nation of those changes, and solicited comments.  The final version
will be published along with an explanation of changes and responses
to comments.219  The principal difference from an EPA rulemaking
imposing environmental assessment requirements on banks is that the
underlying authority was not developed by Congress and the specific
regulatory language was not developed by an executive branch agency
overseen by the President.  Instead, the congressional equivalent is a
group of banks, responding to pressure from environmental groups
and quasi-public institutions such as the IFC and World Bank, and the
agency equivalent is a secretariat working at the direction of the group
of banks.  Figure 1 arrays activities that constitute private and public
ordering or governance from least to most formal.
218 Governments may convene a meeting to stimulate the formation of the standards
and certification system, influence the content of the standards, or enhance (e.g., by
adopting the private standard as a criterion for procurement) or undermine enforcement
of the standards, but they do not control the standard-setting or implementation. See
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SUSTAINABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR PROCUREMENT TOOLS AND
CAPABILITIES: SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP 5 (2012) (noting that the General Services Admin-
istration has substantial leverage to achieve sustainability because of the $95 billion it
spends each year on goods and services).
219 Legal scholars have begun to examine the implications for administrative law of
quasi-governmental organizations at the international level. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury,
Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005).
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Harder cases arise along the spectrum as we move from collective
standard-setting to bilateral standard-setting and from more formal or
institutionalized to less formal or institutionalized activities.  For ex-
ample, the boundary between private governance and simple market
activity is often unclear.  If a company engages in a market transaction
such as a commercial loan or real estate lease, and it only intends to
increase profits by making its operations more efficient, but the effect
of the transaction is to induce one or both parties to act in ways that
achieve traditionally governmental ends (e.g., improving environmen-
tal quality by requiring a clean-up before the transaction can be com-
pleted or by including contract provisions that make environmental
compliance a contract requirement) and to perform traditionally gov-
ernmental functions (e.g., increasing monitoring of environmental
behavior and sanctioning of environmentally risky conduct), has it en-
gaged in private environmental governance?  Similarly, if a company
includes provisions in supply chain contracts requiring a supplier to
reduce carbon emissions out of concern for the company’s reputation
with European consumers, has it engaged in private environmental
governance?
I argue that there is value in viewing the environmental aspects of
these commercial transactions as a form of private environmental gov-
ernance.  Viewing them not just as private transactions but as pri-
vate–private activities that constitute private environmental
governance makes it more likely we will recognize and study their im-
plications for public governance and that we will develop new solu-
tions to collective action problems when government action is not an
option.  For example, we may understand the shadow effects of public
law and design better public laws to harness these effects.  We also
may think about how advocacy groups may not only lobby government
but also how they may lobby private standard-setting organizations or
act directly to create incentives for firms to include private governance
requirements in standard commercial agreements.  The potential rel-
evance of public governance concerns such as accountability, legiti-
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macy, and efficacy for private governance activities also may become
more apparent.
Although the parties to a commercial transaction may have a
profit maximization goal and they may only be improving environ-
mental behavior or environmental quality as a by-product of pursuing
that goal, the end result of the activity and the functions performed by
the private entities, not the intent of the parties, should control.  As to
public governance, we do not determine whether an agency is a gov-
ernmental entity based on whether it or its managers intend to
achieve the public ends they are charged with pursuing, and it is not
clear what value would be added here by requiring prosocial intent by
one or both corporate parties.  Some private governance activities
(e.g., FSC and MSC) are clearly intended to protect environmental
quality or resources, but the individual actors may have very different
motives.  In addition, many private commercial transactions that I ar-
gue are a form of private environmental governance (e.g., Hewlett-
Packard’s or Wal-Mart’s supply chain contracting requirements) likely
involve parties that have a mixture of efficiency, resource supply, com-
petition, and reputational goals that can all be squared neatly with
profit maximization, along with altruistic preferences or norms by
managers, shareholders and customers.  In short, the motivations of
the participants are less likely to be a valuable criterion than the func-
tion or outcome of the activity.
Coherence.  I argue that the various types of activities and organiza-
tions within the boundaries of private environmental governance not
only meet the definition of private environmental governance, but
they also cohere: they all involve private–private interactions that per-
form traditionally governmental functions and pursue governmental
ends, and treating them as a common phenomenon yields insights
into environmental governance.
Standards and certification systems and other forms of private
governance with collective standard-setting are sufficiently similar
to supply chain contracting and other activities with bilateral stan-
dard-setting to lump them both into private environmental govern-
ance.  The important common attribute is that they both can facilitate
environmental protection without government initiating, funding, or
otherwise facilitating the activity.  The result is that policymakers,
when confronting an environmental problem, cannot simply ask what
government can do to resolve the problem.  The action may involve a
private foundation funding an effort by NGOs and corporations to
establish a standards and certification system, or an NGO pressuring
corporate firms to impose supply chain contract standards on suppli-
ers, or a community group pressuring a local industrial facility to dis-
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close and reduce toxic releases in return for stopping a reputation
campaign or supporting local government land-use approvals.
Whether or not any one private governance activity is desirable in
any given situation, they all share the attribute of offering a private
response to an environmental protection problem.  All of these pri-
vate activities affect environmental behavior if not environmental
quality, and all affect the core questions examined by environmental
law scholars: the type of instruments and level of resources necessary
to achieve a desired level of environmental protection.  In addition, a
well-educated environmental lawyer serving a public or private client
will know of the private options when confronting an environmental
problem, and when representing a private client, will be prepared to
engage in the negotiating, drafting, and private dispute resolution
processes common to many of these private governance activities.
B. Has Market Failure Occurred?
Even if private governance has important effects on environmen-
tal behavior, environmental quality, and the instruments available for
environmental governance, economists might respond by arguing
that a market failure has not occurred in the first place.  If the types of
collective and bilateral standard-setting discussed above are simply
market activity, then this is a fair response.  In this approach, individu-
als have preferences for environmental protection, and what I de-
scribe as private environmental governance is simply the reflection of
these preferences in consumer, investor, lender, manager, and other
behavior in the marketplace.220  Although private environmental gov-
ernance activities can be viewed in this way, doing so takes economics
a long way from standard applications of models involving rational
actors seeking to maximize utility.
In theory, utility can be maximized by achieving something other
than personal pecuniary gain.  Prosocial preferences can exist among
individuals’ preferences, but as many law and economics scholars have
argued it is difficult to develop falsifiable hypotheses if these prefer-
ences are included since altruism (maximizing preferences for
prosocial outcomes) becomes indistinguishable from self-interest.221
If pursuing selfish interests includes pursuing prosocial interests, the
220 See, e.g., David P. Baron, Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated
Strategy, 10 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 7, 9 (2001) (concluding that “both motivation and
performance are required for actions to receive the [corporate social responsibility] la-
bel”).  Opposition to use of private environmental governance as a way to improve environ-
mental quality is also grounded in views about the appropriate goals of firms. See, e.g.,
Lurie, supra note 213 (raising concern about a corporation imposing environmental re- R
quirements on suppliers and customers).
221 Mancur Olson recognized that a person may gain utility, such as a feeling of moral
worth, from individual, noncollective rewards for either acting in particular ways or partici-
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notion of rational action, as operationalized by economists, becomes a
tautology.  In addition, if these private governance activities are
viewed as simply a form of market activity arising from the pursuit of
prosocial preferences, the implications of noneconomic preferences
or norms (distributional justice, accountability) for market activity
and the development of new applications to governance problems can
be easily overlooked.  In short, although much of private environmen-
tal governance involves market activity, it involves private behavior
that often has the effect of or is motivated by the desire to manage a
common pool resource, provide a public good, or reduce a negative
externality, topics that are arguably distinct from the typical market
behavior studied by private law scholars.
C. Is Private Environmental Governance of Concern to Lawyers?
Another objection is that the private–private interactions dis-
cussed in Part II are widespread activities that affect environmental
behavior and environmental quality, but they are not important for
understanding or practicing law.  In other words, perhaps environ-
mental consultants, accountants, engineers, and business managers
should take note, but these activities do not require or benefit from
involvement by lawyers.  In some cases private environmental govern-
ance fits neatly into common conceptions of law, but in others it ex-
erts influence but does not look like law.  Perhaps as a result,
private–private interactions are treated in more detail in other litera-
tures than in the legal literature.222
Legal scholars who have examined private–private interactions
have tended to focus on the area of private environmental governance
that most closely resembles public governance: private certification
systems that set and enforce collective standards regarding everything
from environmental management standards to forests, fisheries, and
shade-grown coffee.223  This private collective standard-setting is in-
creasingly important on a global scale, but it is only one of many
forms of private environmental governance.  Understanding the wide
range of private environmental governance activities can induce schol-
ars to rethink the actors and actions available for environmental pro-
tection, as well as the standards of review for evaluating the
performance of legal instruments.
pating in groups, but he concluded that this approach is not “especially useful” because it
is not subject to empirical refutation. See OLSON, supra note 51, at 160 n.91. R
222 See discussion supra Part II.
223 See Meidinger, supra note 78, at 259; Richard L. Barnes, The U.C.C.’s Insidious Prefer- R
ence for Agronomy over Ecology in Farm Lending Decisions, 64 U. COLO. L.  REV. 457 (1993);
Errol E. Meidinger, Environmental Certification Programs and U.S. Environmental Law: Closer
Than You May Think, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10162 (2001) [hereinafter Meidinger, Environmental
Certification Programs]; Roberts, supra note 73; Roberts, supra note 170. R
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Even if a set of institutions and activities can be characterized as
private governance, private environmental governance might not mat-
ter to legal scholars or lawyers if it is not a matter of law.  I do not seek
to add to the literature on the nature and boundaries of law, but I
argue that the examples of private environmental governance I have
discussed are sufficiently close to law or have sufficient effects on law
to be of interest to legal scholars and lawyers. Several reasons support
this conclusion.224
At the outset, private environmental governance is an important
part of what environmental lawyers do.  I discuss this issue in more
detail below, but almost all major law firms report that their lawyers
practice some form of private environmental governance activity.225
Private governance leads to litigation in public and private tribunals.
When environmental lawyers lobby today, they lobby private govern-
ance organizations as well government entities.226  Private governance
activities often generate collective private standards that are enforcea-
ble in actions between private parties over issues regarding compli-
ance with the standards,227 the performance of the standards if
complied with (e.g., does a LEED building yield the anticipated en-
ergy savings?), and other issues.228
Private governance also involves contract provisions between pri-
vate parties that are enforceable in public or private tribunals.  It
often includes enforceable contractual terms that are as much “hard
law” as many forms of regulation, although administrative orders and
criminal enforcement are not a threat.  Similarly, environmental law-
yers working in the private governance area do not draft public regu-
lations, but they draft private standards that look essentially the same
(e.g., FSC or MSC standards), even though they lack the ability to
bind or coerce in the same way.  Lawyers provide advice on the appli-
cation of and compliance with private standards, not just public stan-
224 See Newell et al., supra note 214, at 370.  Many aspects of private environmental R
governance meet frequently used criteria for treatment as “law.”  For example, many pri-
vate governance activities include the development of standards that communicate expec-
tations in advance and the enforcement of standards on others.  One party is monitoring
and coercing the behavior of another, even if the coercing party does not claim the ability
to use the types of sanctions typically reserved to states (e.g., imprisonment).  Disputes are
adjudicated in private and public tribunals. See id. at 369.
225 See Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 2066–67. R
226 For a recent example, see Nelson, supra note 124 (noting that the American Chem- R
istry Council lobbied the USGBC to drop chemical disclosure from the LEED standard).
227 See Margaret M. Blair et al., The New Role for Assurance Services in Global Commerce, 33
J. CORP. L. 325, 325 (2008); Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53
B.C. L. REV. 1, 1 (2012).
228 See, e.g., Anthony J. Campanelli & Christopher Rizzo, DELOITTE, RISKS AND REWARDS
FOR BUILDING SUSTAINABLE HOTELS 7, available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
Greece/Local%20Assets/Documents/Attachments/Real%20Estate/RiskandRewards_Ho
tels.pdf.
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dards.229  They do not just file comments on and advocate before
public agencies on public regulations, but they also file comments
with private organizations regarding proposed standards.230  They do
not just challenge agency actions in courts, but they also challenge
private standards in courts and other forums.231
Finally, one cannot fully predict the effects of public laws without
accounting for private governance.  Private environmental govern-
ance affects legislative and agency lawyers because government action
can harness private governance (e.g., by requiring information disclo-
sure that will drive supply chain contracting or by creating incentives
for environmental diligence activities), promote it (e.g., through the
federal General Services Administration’s ninety-five billion dollar
procurement budget),232 undermine it (e.g., by adoption of weak
public standards that displace stronger private standards), or prevent
it (e.g., through legislation or agency antitrust or anti-deception en-
forcement actions).  An understanding of private governance thus is
often necessary to design optimal public statutes, regulations, and
policies.
D. Does Private Environmental Governance Matter?
The discussion above suggests that a wide range of private govern-
ance activities are occurring and that a large number of corporate
firms and landowners have publicly committed to comply with private
environmental governance programs (e.g., certification systems) or
have legal or economic incentives to change behavior that are influ-
enced by private environmental governance activities (e.g., supply
chain contracts).  But does this activity affect firm behavior or environ-
mental quality?  To what extent are corporate private environmental
governance activities just greenwashing?  The widespread adoption of
these programs does not demonstrate that these programs have sub-
stantial impacts, and the absence of government coercion raises con-
cerns about whether these programs are simply providing a public
relations cover for participating firms and advocacy groups.  The dis-
cussion below examines the effects of private environmental govern-
ance activities in three areas: (1) the effects on the standards used for
environmental instrument choice and for judging the performance of
229 See Kinney & Hughes, supra note 123. R
230 See Nelson, supra note 124. R
231 Private environmental governance also raises legal issues when it affects interna-
tional trade. See Cohen & Vandenbergh, supra note 74, at S59–S60. R
232 For a discussion of the relationship between private governance and public pro-
curement, see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 218, at 5. R
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those instruments; (2) the effects on the environmental behavior of
corporate firms; and (3) the effects on environmental quality.233
1. Standards
At the outset, it is important to identify a proper heuristic for
evaluating the effects of private governance programs.  Doing so con-
fronts two related challenges:  (1) accounting for public and private
options in the standard of review; and (2) uncertain spillover effects.
Standard of Review. In a world with only public governance mea-
sures, it may be appropriate to ask whether a particular measure will
solve a problem, and that is the question that is often asked in theoret-
ical work234 and policy debates.235  The question is appropriately
framed in this way because the government has coercive power, so in
many cases government policymakers have the ability to select and
enforce a measure that will solve the problem.  Public governance
measures can certainly be interim measures, but presumably the
choice of an interim measure was made because it was thought to be
the optimal action in that situation.  Once selected, it is appropriate
for assessors (whether scholars, executive branch entities such as an
agency Inspector General or the Office of Management and Budget,
or congressional entities such as the General Accountability Office
and oversight committees) to evaluate the measure based on whether
it solved the problem.  Did air pollution achieve ambient standards?
Did pesticide makers comply with labeling requirements?  Is the har-
vest from a forest or fishery sustainable?  Of course, political viability
may limit the ability of government to adopt adequate measures, but
in theory the ability to achieve outcomes, either via domestic or inter-
national action, exists, and political viability is often not a subject of
scholarly interest.236
If we take private governance seriously, however, a different stan-
dard is appropriate for judging which measures should be pursued
and for evaluating their performance.  Since private governance often
will be gap-filling or complementary to public governance, it may suc-
ceed without solving the problem or being the optimal solution.  In
fact, in many cases private governance measures may be second- or
third-best options.  For large-scale global problems, a growing body of
233 Many private certification and labeling systems also have economic and social goals,
but the environmental goals are typically at the core of these systems, and I focus on them
here. See TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 35, at 57. R
234 See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Poli-
cies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1962 (2007).
235 See Levi, supra note 21, at 78. R
236 See Gilligan & Vandenbergh, supra note 40, at 2 (noting the importance of political R
opportunity costs in climate instrument choice).
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scholarship argues that comprehensive solutions are not necessary.237
For example, Elinor Ostrom noted that the actions of governments
and other organizations at many levels could produce large-scale ef-
fects in the aggregate.238  A private governance measure often will not
provide a complete response, but it may be part of an optimal mix of
public and private measures.
When evaluating whether private governance measures have suc-
ceeded, the question is not whether a particular fishery or forest or
airshed is now sustainable, well-managed, or has achieved a desired
level of ambient air quality, but rather whether the change from what
would have happened in the absence of the private governance mea-
sure is worth the cost.  This is a difficult standard to apply, but not
framing the question this way can lead to a systemic bias against pri-
vate governance measures.  If a fishery would have become depleted
in ten years, but with a private governance measure it will not become
sustainable but will not be depleted for fifty years, has it succeeded?
Under the approach that prevails in the current policy debate, the
answer is no: The fishery is not sustainable.239  As a result, public and
private support for private governance measures is discouraged be-
cause the critique that resonates is that the system is failing.  If a pub-
lic governance measure was not viable, however, is adding forty years
to the life of a fishery that ultimately becomes depleted a success or
failure?  Private governance measures often are under consideration
because ideal options are not viable.
Spillover Effects. Another important factor in assessing the success
of private governance actions is the effect of a private governance op-
tion on existing governance measures and on the likelihood of adopt-
ing other public or private governance options.240  Private governance
could fill gaps where public governance cannot reach because of polit-
ical, territorial, or expertise gaps.  It also could undermine, enhance,
delay, accelerate, or complement government action in situations
where government can act.  If taking a private governance step today
237 See Thomas Dietz, Gerald T. Gardner, Jonathan Gilligan, Paul C. Stern & Michael
P. Vandenbergh, Household Actions Can Provide a Behavioral Wedge to Rapidly Reduce US Car-
bon Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 18452, 18452 (2009); Keohane & Victor, supra
note 177, at 7; Elinor Ostrom, Nested Externalities and Polycentric Institutions: Must We Wait for R
Global Solutions to Climate Change Before Taking Actions at Other Scales?, 49 ECON. THEORY 353,
353 (2012); S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the
Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968, 968 (2004).
238 See Ostrom, supra note 237, at 356. R
239 See Jacquet et al., supra note 212, at 29; see also Allen Blackman & Jorge Rivera, The R
Evidence Base for Environmental and Socioeconomic Impacts of “Sustainable” Certification 3–5
(Env’t for Dev. Discussion Paper Series), available at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-
DP-10-17.pdf (discussing the counterfactual analysis problem).
240 See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 24, at 23–26 (discussing spillover effects as R
externalities).
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will undermine support for a more effective measure, it may do more
harm than good.  Negative spillover effects could occur at the institu-
tional and individual levels.  At the institutional level (e.g., corpora-
tions, foundations, universities, and other non-profit organizations), if
there is a fixed pool of management time and money in an organiza-
tion, spending it on advocating for or developing and implementing
private governance measures could reduce the amount available for
public governance.  At the individual level (e.g., whether the individ-
ual is acting as a voter, civic group participant or leader, or is engag-
ing in household behavior), time and money spent on advocating for
or engaging in private governance could drain resources from public
governance.241
For example, economists point to the single action bias as a rea-
son to avoid pursuing remedies other than a carbon tax or cap and
trade.242  The single action bias suggests that by taking a small mea-
sure, individuals will be induced to believe that they have reduced the
risk from the underlying problem and will become less supportive of
other steps to address the problem—a form of negative spillover.243
Spillover effects are complicated, however, and positive spillover ef-
fects also could occur.  The adoption of a private governance program
could increase the prospects for a public program by demonstrating
the feasibility of a type of action, creating a constituency to support
government action, or reducing the cost to private firms of govern-
ment action.  At the institutional level, public actions often will be less
expensive if private actions have induced action.  For example,
Wal-Mart’s imposition of efficiency requirements on suppliers will
make a domestic and international carbon tax less burdensome on
those suppliers and presumably will reduce their resistance to a policy
that reduces carbon from the energy supply.  In addition, private gov-
ernance may induce corporations to become advocates for public or
private programs.244
Similarly, at the individual level, a host of social psychological
studies suggest that negative spillover may not occur in many situa-
tions or may be overwhelmed by other phenomena that cause positive
241 See, e.g., GERNOT WAGNER, BUT WILL THE PLANET NOTICE?: HOW SMART ECONOMICS
CAN SAVE THE WORLD 7 (2011) (arguing that single action bias research is a basis for not
pursuing policies that target household behavior).  Gernot Wagner and colleagues recently
examined the literature on the energy rebound effect, a related phenomenon, and con-
cluded that “rebound effects are small and are therefore no excuse for inaction.” See Ken-
neth Gillingham, Matthew J. Kotchen, David S. Rapson & Gernot Wagner, The Rebound
Effect is Overplayed, 493 NATURE 475, 476 (2013).
242 See BREYER, supra note 24, at 23–26. R
243 See Elke U. Weber, Experience-Based and Description-Based Perceptions of Long-Term Risk:
Why Global Warming Does Not Scare Us (Yet), 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 103, 115–16 (2006).
244 See Eric Biber, Cultivating a Green Political Landscape: Lessons for Climate Change Policy
from the Defeat of California’s Proposition 23, 66 VAND. L. REV. 399, 424 n.99 (2013).
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spillover effects.  Examples of these psychological phenomena include
gateway effects, cognitive dissonance, availability, active learning, and
others.245  Whether the individual is acting as a consumer, voter, civic
group participant, or leader, or is engaging in household behavior,
these psychological phenomena suggest that engaging in private gov-
ernance activities might increase support for public governance.
In addition, private governance can strengthen public measures,
making it more likely that they will withstand challenges.  For exam-
ple, the CDM Gold Standard is a private governance program that was
formed to enhance a government program (the CDM offset program
of the Kyoto Protocol).246  Private governance programs can serve as a
means of experimenting with policy options (e.g., offsets) at low risk
to policymakers, enhancing the prospects for later government ac-
tion.247  Private governance programs also can enhance legality verifi-
cation, suggesting that these efforts may be particularly valuable in
countries with adequate public laws but weak public enforcement.248
At this point in the development of private environmental govern-
ance, it is not possible to quantify spillover effects, and the effects
likely vary.  The important point for now is to avoid asymmetric credu-
lity—the tendency to give credence to those theories or studies that fit
a mental model while being incredulous toward those that do not.249
The potential role of private governance is too large and the range of
studies and applications is too great not to examine negative and posi-
tive spillover effects, rather than making assumptions that only one or
the other will occur.
2. Effects on Environmental Behavior
The desirability of private governance activities hinges in large
part on the effects of these systems on corporate environmental be-
havior.  Plausible scenarios can be advanced in which these programs
have substantial impacts or are little more than window dressing.  Al-
though the effects of private environmental governance on the envi-
ronmentally significant behavior of firms (e.g., reductions in toxics
use by a corporation) and on environmental quality (e.g., changes in
concentrations of toxics in a stream) have not been thoroughly stud-
245 See A. AUSTIN ET AL., DEP’T FOR ENV’T, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, EXPLORING CATA-
LYST BEHAVIOURS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 (2011).
246 For a discussion, see Levin et al., supra note 132. R
247 See Robert J. Brulle et al., Shifting Public Opinion on Climate Change: An Empirical
Assessment of Factors Influencing Concern over Climate Change in the U.S., 2002–2010, CLIMATIC
CHANGE 1 (2012), available at http://www.pages.drexel.edu/~brullerj/02-12Climate
ChangeOpinion.Fulltext.pdf.
248 See Cashore & Stone, supra note 78, at 13. R
249 See Gilligan & Vandenbergh, supra note 40, at 2. R
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ied, some initial conclusions emerge from the literature.250  I distin-
guish the corporate participation in private governance discussed in
Part I (e.g., an agreement to comply with the Equator Principles)
from corporate environmental behavior, by which I mean the activi-
ties that a firm engages in that directly affect its impact on environ-
mental quality or resource use such as emissions of pollutants, levels
of energy use, and the practices the firm uses for extracting natural
resources.  The former is an indication of participation in private envi-
ronmental governance activities, but the latter is an indication that
behavior change is occurring that might affect environmental quality.
A deeper research base is available on older private governance activi-
ties (e.g., certification systems for forestry) than on newer systems
(e.g., commodities roundtables).  In addition, more research is availa-
ble on the impacts of private governance on the behavior of large
corporate firms and local business or individual actors (e.g., forest
owners and foresters) than on any resulting changes in environmental
quality.  As the discussion below demonstrates, rigorous empirical
studies and a large amount of anecdotal information suggest that
some private governance activities are associated with substantial
changes in corporate environmental behavior.
For instance, empirical studies of private certification systems sug-
gest that many of these systems have changed the environmental be-
havior of participants.  A recent study of private sustainability
certification systems for agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and aquacul-
ture identified hundreds of case studies, several dozen large-sample-
size quantitative and qualitative studies, and a few peer-reviewed,
large-scale evaluations of these systems.251  The study concluded that
the effects of certification systems on the behavior of the corporate
firms and farms that produce certified goods are better understood
than the effects on environmental quality.  In many cases, certification
systems were designed to advance adoption of practices rather than
environmental conditions or outcomes, and although some certifica-
tion systems seek to ensure that the certified activities are environ-
mentally appropriate, many certify only that management processes
have been followed.252
The study concluded that standards, practices, and performance
expectations established in the context of voluntary systems have be-
come the norm for many producers and consumers in some markets,
and in some cases were later institutionalized in public regulations
250 See TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 35, at 45–56. R
251 See id. at ES-1.
252 See Meidinger, Environmental Certification Programs, supra note 223, at 10163–64. R
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(e.g., green building codes).253  In addition, despite the data limita-
tions and difficulties of establishing causation, research suggests that
certification standards have had extensive influence on the adoption
of sustainability practices by firms and farms.  For example, a number
of studies have found that foresters working in forests managed under
the FSC program engage in different practices from those in noncerti-
fied forests.254  Similarly, a 2006 study concluded that MSC-certified
fisheries demonstrated improved management practices and informa-
tion disclosures.255
A variety of sources also suggest that information of the type
often conveyed through certification systems has had substantial ef-
fects on individual behavior.  When consumers became concerned
that ozone-depleting chemicals from aerosol cans were causing the
hole in the stratospheric ozone layer, the market for aerosol cans de-
clined dramatically, and the decline continued even after the suspect
chemicals were removed.256  When consumers became concerned
about the killing of dolphin to catch tuna, sales of canned tuna in the
United States declined, and retailers responded to advocacy group
pressure by selling only tuna with dolphin-safe labels.257  Today, even
though there is no legal requirement to sell dolphin-safe tuna, there is
essentially no market for unlabeled tuna.
Many firms have been induced to adopt environmental manage-
ment systems despite the absence of a public regulatory requirement
to do so, and many have required their suppliers to adopt these sys-
tems.258  The most widespread collectively set environmental manage-
ment standard, ISO 14001, requires the adoption of a number of
environmental practices by firms.  Hundreds of thousands of firms
have announced that they comply with ISO 14001, and studies suggest
that firms that are in compliance change some environmental
practices.259
In addition, although information about firm environmental be-
havior is rarely a matter of public record in the absence of govern-
ment enforcement actions or litigation, the environmental activities
associated with commercial transactions affect corporate behavior in
253 The study did not find evidence of private standards locking in suboptimal stan-
dards. See TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 35, at ES-12. R
254 See id. at 62.
255 See id. at 61 & Appendix E.
256 See Peter M. Morrisette, The Evolution of Policy Responses to Stratospheric Ozone Deple-
tion, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 793, 800 (1989).
257 See Teisl et al., supra note 181, at 339. R
258 See supra notes 127–30 and accompanying text. R
259 See Richard N. L. Andrews et al., Environmental Management Under Pressure: How Do
Mandates Affect Performance?, in LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED
STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 111, 117–18 (Cary Coglianese &
Jennifer Nash eds., 2006).
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ways that are likely to influence the environmental performance of
firms and environmental quality.260  For example, as stated at the out-
set, more money is spent on private environmental inspections than
the entire budget of the federal environmental enforcement office.261
A 2005 study revealed that almost all of the top fifty private law firms
in the U.S. by profits per partner have lawyers engaged in the types of
environmental transactional practice that involves the supervision of
these environmental investigations and the negotiating, drafting, and
enforcing of the provisions in these agreements.262  Although much of
the $500 million spent on private environmental investigations each
year is driven by efforts to reduce liability under or increase compli-
ance with public environmental laws, the private activity adds a layer
of private monitoring and enforcement.
In other cases, environmental investigations may be driven by
concerns about reducing reputational or other risks that have little or
no connection to public law requirements.  For instance, the $500 mil-
lion annual figure does not include the environmental assessment ac-
tivities required by banks to comply with the Equator Principles or the
Carbon Principles.  Some of these costs involve assessments of project
compliance with public environmental laws, but much of the costs
arise from assessments of project impacts not addressed by public
laws.  If the project is a windmill in Texas that is not on federal land,
many of the applicable requirements may arise from compliance with
the Equator Principles’ requirements for disclosure of environmental
assessments and environmental performance rather than from con-
cerns about compliance with federal, state, or local environmental
laws.  Environmental assessments may evaluate this private compliance
as much as compliance with public regulations.
The $500 million private environmental investigation figure also
does not include the costs of private audits conducted on behalf of
firms seeking to achieve or maintain a certification under the various
environmental private certification systems.  The total expended on
this type of private environmental enforcement is unclear, but there
are indications that the amount is large.  For example, corporate firms
260 One area of promising research is the connection between private transactions and
the disclosure of information about toxics releases required by the Toxic Release Inventory
program. See Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information as Regulation: The Effect of Com-
munity Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109, 109 (1997).
For a proposal involving stimulation of private environmental governance by government
disclosure of corporate sustainability data, see Wendy E. Wagner, Imagining Corporate Sus-
tainability as a Public Good Rather than a Corporate Bad, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 561, 562
(2011).
261 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. R
262 See Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 2067–68. R
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spend tens of millions of dollars each year on the market for private
assurance services.263
3. Effects on Environmental Quality
The impacts of private governance activities on environmental
quality are less clear.  It is difficult to connect many private govern-
ance activities with specific changes in environmental quality at the
local or regional levels.  As with the overall standard of review applied
to private governance systems, however, it is important to apply the
appropriate standard to an evaluation of environmental impacts.  The
relevant comparison for private governance activities is the state of
knowledge of the environmental impacts of viable alternative public
governance activities.
In short, we understand a great deal about the relationship be-
tween government enforcement activities and the compliance rates
and emissions of regulated firms, but we understand less about the
relationship between public environmental governance and environ-
mental quality.  On the whole, the adoption of the environmental reg-
ulatory program required by the major statutes of the 1970–1990
period corresponds to an improvement in many indicators of environ-
mental quality regarding air, water, and waste, although even that pro-
position has been challenged in recent years.264  Government
programs in some specific areas have been tied to environmental qual-
ity improvements (e.g., changes in ambient concentrations of hazard-
ous air pollutant emissions in response to the maximum achievable
technology requirements, and sulfur dioxide emissions in response to
the emissions trading system imposed by the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments).  For many government programs, however, it is re-
markably difficult to tie a particular program to a measured change in
local or regional environmental conditions even if some impact is very
plausible.  Perhaps the best evidence of the challenge of establishing
the nexus between government environmental programs and environ-
mental conditions is the difficulty that federal environmental agencies
have had complying with the requirements to set and track progress
toward the achievement of goals in the Government Performance and
Results Act.265  The limited ability to connect governance activities to
263 See Blair et al., supra note 227, at 329. R
264 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, The Fable of Federal Regulation: No, States Didn’t Ignore
Environmental Problems, PROP. & ENV’T RES. CENTER REP., Winter 2004, available at http://
perc.org/articles/fable-federal-regulation (concluding that “[t]he oft-told explanation for
federal environmental legislation—that ever-deteriorating environmental quality made
federal regulation necessary—does not fit the historical record”).
265 See Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat.
285 (requiring the development of goal and annual performance reports); see also EPA
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF EPA’S AIR PROGRAM iv, 34
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changes in environmental conditions thus exists for public and private
governance systems, and it is important not to hold them to different
standards.
Nevertheless, it is fair to conclude that our understanding of the
environmental quality effects of private governance is very shallow.
The recent comprehensive review of the literature on sustainability
certification systems discussed above observed that localized impacts
have been identified more often than impacts at a larger scale (e.g.,
watersheds).  The study identified few rigorous, experimentally de-
signed and controlled studies of the long-term, large-scale impacts of
certification systems, and it concluded that there are insufficient data
to determine the cumulative effects on ecosystems.266
Unpacking the available research on two certification systems
provides a sense of the state of knowledge and the impacts that might
be detected if additional studies were conducted.  As to forests, the
study concluded that nine percent of all productive forests are subject
to FSC standards.  Studies comparing forests managed under the FSC
program to other forests have found changes in forest practices but
have not detected changes in the ecosystem health of the certified
forests.267  As to fisheries, seven percent of all fish caught for human
consumption are from fisheries subject to the MSC standards, and a
recent study commissioned by the MSC of more than twenty MSC-
certified fisheries found substantial positive effects on stock status (the
number of fish).268  The MSC certification system has been less suc-
cessful in reducing bycatch and maintaining overall biodiversity
conservation.269
The literature on the environmental quality effects of other forms
of private environmental governance is even less robust.  Collective
environmental management systems such as ISO 14001 do not require
the achievement of specific environmental standards or compliance
rates, and it is difficult to determine the effects of these systems on the
environmental behavior of the firms that adopt them.  Several empiri-
cal studies have found a correlation, however, between environmental
management standards and environmental performance.270  Simi-
larly, collective information disclosure standards such as GRI and CDP
(1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/1998/8100057.pdf (noting lack of re-
liable emission factors for air pollutants and difficulty of establishing programmatic im-
pacts on air pollution).
266 See TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 35, at 72.  The report also concluded that R
the indirect impacts of private certification systems are substantial and may be greater than
the direct impacts. See id. at ES-8.
267 See id. at 62.
268 See id. at 61.
269 See id. at 64–65; Jacquet et al., supra note 212, at 28–29. R
270 See Coglianese, supra note 127, at 71; Petra Christmann & Glen Taylor, Globalization R
and the Environment: Determinants of Firm Self-Regulation in China, 32 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 439,
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require disclosure by participants but do not require improvements in
environmental performance, and the effects of these programs on en-
vironmental questions remains unclear.  A robust literature exists on
the effects of public information disclosure requirements on pollutant
emissions by corporate firms, however, and this literature suggests that
firms that are higher emitters in their sectors tend to suffer adverse
stock prices after the public disclosure of their emissions data and
tend to reduce emission more than peer firms following the disclo-
sure.271  Private disclosure programs may differ since low-emitting
firms may participate in these programs and high-emitting firms may
not.  At the same time, firms appear to be responding to a variety of
incentives to participate, which may expand the group of participants
beyond the lowest-emitting firms.272
The environmental effects of private governance arising from bi-
lateral standard-setting are perhaps the least understood.  Anecdotal
information suggests that activity involving supply chain contracts and
other commercial transactions is very widespread, and there are indi-
cations that large numbers of private parties are performing the types
of standard-setting, monitoring, enforcement, and adjudication func-
tions that governments often play.  These private activities could lead
to effects on environmental quality, but there is almost no literature
on the topic.  The direction of these effects may vary as well.  In many
cases, the private governance activity is conducted by a party that has
an incentive to produce improved environmental quality or reduced
resource use (e.g., a prospective buyer, tenant, or lender conducting
environmental diligence to assess environmental risks).  In some
others, the private party may have incentives to act in ways that in-
crease environmental harms or resource use (e.g., corporate transac-
tions designed to place environmental liabilities in separate corporate
entities to avoid the costs of public environmental laws).
A remarkable development in the last two decades, however, is
the growth in the number of firms that are engaging in environmental
supply-chain contracting activities that are likely to have the effect of
improving environmental quality.  For example, it is possible that
there will be no net carbon emissions reductions from Wal-Mart’s re-
cent insistence that its top suppliers in China increase energy effi-
ciency by twenty percent, despite Wal-Mart’s estimate of a twenty
million metric ton reduction.  Increased efficiency could occur with-
out the contract requirement, or the lower price of imported goods or
449–52 (2001); Aseem Prakash & Matthew Potoski, Investing Up: FDI and the Cross-Country
Diffusion of ISO 14001 Management Systems, 51 INT’L STUD. Q. 723, 723 (2007).
271 See Konar & Cohen, supra note 260, at 109. R
272 See David Vogel, Private Global Business Regulation, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 261,
268–69 (2007) (concluding that “win-win” situations for businesses are not common).
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the improved reputation of Wal-Mart from the requirement could in-
crease carbon emissions on net by increasing the volume of goods
sold, overwhelming the emissions reductions from efficiency gains.  It
is also possible that the $500 million spent each year on environmen-
tal investigations in commercial transactions in the U.S. is not reduc-
ing the environmental harms caused by the facilities subject to these
investigations over and above the requirements of public laws.  On the
surface, however, the more plausible inference seems to be that a sub-
stantial, if poorly understood, effect is occurring on environmental
quality and that the effect is in the direction of reduced emissions and
improved environmental quality.
E. Why Is the Scope of Private Governance Hard to See?
If private environmental governance is widespread, and if empiri-
cal studies demonstrate that it affects corporate behavior and possibly
environmental conditions, why do scholars and policymakers typically
look for public law remedies to environmental problems?  The answer
discussed above is conceptual framing: the standard public law model
does not view a private certification system as a type of environmental
law, and private law scholars typically are not focused on the public
implications of private market behavior.  Private governance also may
not be apparent because it lacks a common nomenclature, and many
of the terms used to describe positive law subtly steer us away from
thinking about the private role in environmental governance.273  No
single name has emerged for private governance, and the terminolog-
ical profusion reduces the extent to which the common aspects of the
underlying activities and organizations are understood, refined, and
extended.
In addition, the assumption that environmental governance is a
matter of public law is incorporated into the language of governance.
Scholars often ask whether government will act to address a problem
when the better question is whether some institution, whether public
or private, will act.  Instead of asking whether politicians or govern-
ment can respond to a problem, the better question may be whether
policymakers or institutions can respond to a problem, so long as the
term “policymakers” includes not only government officials but also
includes the leaders of advocacy groups, foundations, think tanks, and
corporations.274  If not, we may need to substitute a different term for
policymaker since the “policy” may be a private lending standard, a
273 See, e.g., Levi, supra note 21, at 73 (noting the “central question” in climate policy is R
where government should intervene).
274 A successful, recent example is KAI N. LEE ET AL., HUMANS IN THE LANDSCAPE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES 47, 310 (2013) (referring to the response of
“societal institutions” to collective action problems).
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product certification and labeling standard, or a contract term rather
than a statute.  Instead of statute or regulation, the better term may be
standard or requirement.  Instead of regulation, the better term may
be governance.  Instead of environmental compliance, the better term
may be environmental performance, since formal environmental law
compliance (e.g., the absence of permit violations) is quite different
from environmental performance (e.g., the total amount of emissions
or resource use).
Perhaps the most important reason that private governance may
not be fully accounted for is that the metrics by which we measure the
importance of environmental law do not include many private govern-
ance activities.275  The standard metrics used to monitor environmen-
tal law include the number of major statutes and regulations, the costs
and benefits of major regulations, the number of pages devoted to
environmental issues in the Federal Register, the size of agency budg-
ets and staff, and the number of enforcement actions and reported
decisions.  In private environmental governance activities, environ-
mental preferences are expressed not through voting or other forms
of participation in the political process but through purchasing,
lending, investing, and supply-chain contracting decisions.276  Stan-
dard-setting does not occur through Congress and agencies but
through private stakeholder groups or supply-chain contract negotia-
tions.  Enforcement occurs not through administrative inspections
and sanctions but through shaming, boycotts, and contract disputes.
Dispute resolution often occurs not in federal or state courts but in
private negotiations and mediation or arbitration proceedings.  As a
result, private governance creates incentives for shifts in corporate
and individual environmental behavior without generating new stat-
utes, regulations, government enforcement actions, or court
decisions.277
275 A number of public law scholars have noted aspects of the development of private
environmental governance, but the broad scope of the private governance activities that
have emerged and the relationship of private governance to the absence of statutory activ-
ity remain unexplored. See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 11, at 187–88 (noting the emergence R
of private certification and labeling); David Rejeski, Any Big Ideas Left?, 28 ENVTL. F. 36, 38
(2011) (suggesting that private governance was an area of activity during the last two de-
cades); see also Orts, supra note 170, at 198 (suggesting a contracting approach to address R
carbon emissions).
276 The influence of purchasing, lending, investing, and supply-chain contracting deci-
sions is difficult to assess, but the potential influence is apparent from a number of sources.
See, e.g., USSIF FOUNDATION, REPORT ON SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS
IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2012) (concluding that “assets engaged in sustainable and re-
sponsible investing practice currently represent 11.3 percent of the $33.3 trillion in total
assets under management tracked by Thomson Reuters Nelson”).
277 See Andrew A. King & Michael J. Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions:
The Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Program, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 698, 713 (2000) (con-
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F. Will Private Environmental Governance Lead to New
Instruments?
Much of the environmental scholarly literature and policy debate
continues to assume that government is the relevant actor and to ex-
amine the relative merits of government-created and enforced instru-
ments.278  The emergence of private governance often occurs in areas
where public preferences for environmental protection are wide-
spread but government has not acted at all or a gap remains.  This
suggests that new approaches may be possible for some of the most
intractable environmental problems.
Private governance responses have been launched or proposed
recently for many of these types of problems.  For example, although
national and international action on climate change is proceeding
very slowly, private supply-chain contracting requirements regarding
carbon emissions and energy use have grown dramatically, and
Wal-Mart’s recent commitment to reduce its supply-chain emissions by
twenty million metric tons of carbon dioxide is only the most promi-
nent example.279  In 2008, a number of leading U.S. lenders, working
with three environmental groups and several power producers, agreed
to abide by the Carbon Principles, which require the assessment and
disclosure of carbon risks in loans to the electric power industry.280  In
addition, private carbon labeling of consumer goods and private cor-
porate emissions disclosure standards are all proposed or existing in-
terim options that could buy time for more comprehensive
government measures.281  These options also could build support for
the other measures and could complement them after they are
adopted.
A second area of opportunity is hydro-fracking, which promises
to generate large quantities of natural gas but also presents substantial
environmental risks.282  Federal, state, and local government actions
cluding that without adequate sanction mechanisms in place, the worst polluters were
drawn to participate in voluntary regulation schemes).
278 See, e.g., Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 64, at 502 n.11; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & R
David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to
Global Warming than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 6–8 (2009).
279 See WAL-MART, supra note 150.  For analysis of characteristics that contribute to suc- R
cessful private governance programs, see Karen Bradshaw Schulz, New Governance and In-
dustry Culture, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2515 (2013).
280 See CARBON PRINCIPLES, supra note 158. R
281 See Kenneth W. Abbott, Strengthening the Transnational Regime Complex for Climate
Change, TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2219554; Orts, supra note 170, at 198; Vandenbergh & Cohen, supra note 179, at 221–92; R
Vandenbergh, supra note 144, at 939–40; Michael P. Vandenbergh, Thomas Dietz & Paul R
C. Stern, Time to Try Carbon Labelling, 1 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 4, 4 (2011).
282 See generally NAT’L PETROLEUM COUNCIL, PRUDENT DEVELOPMENT: REALIZING THE PO-
TENTIAL OF NORTH AMERICA’S ABUNDANT NATURAL GAS AND OIL RESOURCES (2011), available
at http://www.npc.org/reports/NARD-ExecSummVol.pdf (providing overview of natural
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have varied from a statutory ban on certain federal agency actions, to
a state moratorium on drilling, to a wide range of regulations.  A
database of fracking fluids has emerged, and recent proposals include
not only public governance proposals but also proposals for pub-
lic–private hybrids and private governance options.283  Similarly, al-
though the federal government has not banned environmental
estrogens from consumer products and state actions have been incon-
sistent, private governance options have filled the gap, with private
firms announcing corporate policy changes or agreements to remove
estrogenic substances from their supply chains.284  These are just ini-
tial examples of the opportunities presented by private environmental
governance.285
CONCLUSION
This Article examines the emerging importance of private envi-
ronmental governance.  For many issues, public governance remains
the dominant or sole influence on environmental behavior and envi-
ronmental conditions, and theoretical and applied approaches to en-
vironmental law have proceeded as if environmental law is a positive
field waiting for another period of government activity.  Proposals
have focused on new or modified public law remedies and the ave-
nues for governments to adopt them.
Although the standard model of environmental law as a positive
law field accurately described the first two decades of environmental
law, it is no longer sufficient to assume that government is the only or
even the best actor for many environmental problems.  The available
environmental instruments are not limited to those that governments
have the legal authority, expertise, and political will to implement.
gas fracking benefits and risks); Jeff Tollefson, Methane Leaks Erode Green Credentials of Natu-
ral Gas, 493 NATURE 12 (2013).
283 A database has been formed to collect and disclose fracking data. See FRACFOCUS,
http://www.fracfocusdata.org (last visited Aug. 29, 2013).  Recent scholarship in this area
reflects the growing awareness of private governance options. See David B. Spence, Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility in the Oil and Gas Industry: The Importance of Reputational Risk, 86
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 60 (2011); Hannah J. Wiseman, The Private Role in Public Fracturing
Disclosure and Regulation, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 49, 49 (2013); Hari M. Osofsky &
Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance 1 (Minn. Legal Studies Research Paper No.
12-49, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2147860.
284 See, e.g., Liz Szabo, Companies Graded on Getting Chemical BPA Out of Cans, USA TO-
DAY (Oct. 22, 2010, 11:09 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/yourlife/food/safety/
2010-10-21-bpa-cans_N.htm (noting that the Food and Drug Administration has not regu-
lated BPA but that in the face of advocacy group pressure, thirty-two percent of food com-
panies had announced timelines or agreements to remove the chemical from can linings).
285 An emerging body of scholarship is beginning to identify other potential applica-
tions of private governance. See, e.g., LYTTON, supra note 102 (food); Kyle W. Robisch, R
Note, Getting to the (Non)Point: Private Governance as a Solution to Nonpoint Source Pollution,
67 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (non-point source water pollution).
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Positive law and government action are still very important, but pri-
vate environmental governance is surprisingly important for many of
the most pressing environmental problems.
The key conceptual step offered by private governance is that
public action is not the only way to achieve public ends.  This is a
deceptively simple proposition, but it is remarkable how often the
question asked in public debates is “what can government do?”  The
existence of private governance suggests that the question should be
whether a public or a private actor can be mobilized and whether a
public or private governance option, or some mix of the two, will pro-
duce the desired outcome.
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